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ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS




One of the most intriguing yet obscure developments in
corporate environmental stewardship in recent years has been the
development and rapid worldwide spread of environmental
management systems (EMSs) and EMS standards such as the
International Organization for Standardization's ISO 14000 series.
These initiatives for corporate "greening" have received very little
attention from public interest non-governmental organizations
(NGOs) and the popular news media. The bodies that develop them-
most prominently, the International Organization for Standardization
(ISO)-are influential yet little-known organizations which have gone
almost entirely unnoticed in the recent wave of public controversy
and grassroots protest regarding globalization and free trade that has
engulfed the major intergovernmental trade and financial institutions.
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Nonetheless voluntary EMS initiatives and the organizations that
develop them have significant implications for environmental quality,
health and prevailing conceptions of "public" and "private" in local,
national and global law and politics.
Interest in EMSs and EMS standards is growing quickly as
more and more governments, business firms, researchers and activists
become aware of their potentially broad implications. One of the
questions that has sparked the most interest, particularly among
lawyers and legal academics, is how these voluntary corporate
stewardship initiatives can or should relate to law and public policy.
In particular, there is widespread interest in whether and to what
extent EMSs might supplement or replace conventional "command-
and-control" approaches to government environmental regulation,
which are widely perceived as near or already beyond their limits. A
growing number of public authorities around the world are
experimenting with various ways of integrating EMSs and EMS
standards into their environmental policies, programs and laws.
Along with this experimentation has come increased attention from
business, environmentalists and researchers.
Notwithstanding this growing attention, some of the most
intriguing questions about EMSs and EMS standards have been
largely ignored. Two features of the existing legal academic literature
on EMSs (and, for that matter, other voluntary environmental
initiatives) lead to this result. First, the literature tends to ask a limited
range of questions about these initiatives and their implications.
These questions, while important, deflect attention from other
important questions. Second, notwithstanding some attempts to
transcend the conceptual categories of "public" and "private,"
mandatory and voluntary, state and market, and so on, the literature
remains by and large transfixed by these received conceptual
dichotomies.
These features lead to two important limitations in the
existing literature. First, while attention is directed increasingly at the
relationship between "private" corporate environmental initiatives
and "public" policy, the tendency to assume a dichotomous
distinction between these two categories prevents a clearer compre-
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hension of the subtle and complex inter-penetration of "public" and
"private" actors and regulatory systems in the field of environmental
management systems. Public authorities, including legislatures,
regulators and courts, are implicated in complicated ways in the
establishment, shaping and operation of private authority. I attempt
to sketch the extent and complexity of this inter-penetration by
proposing a typology of the modes of engagement between public
authorities and EMS initiatives, using the case of Canada as an
illustration.
I suggest that public authorities' interactions with EMSs and
other voluntary environmental initiatives can be described in eight
categories: steering (influencing the development, use or content of
voluntary initiatives through official policy pronouncements,
participation in standards development or creation of legal "ground
rules" or "backstops" for voluntary initiatives), self-discipline
(applying voluntary initiatives to government operations or agreeing
to international trade rules that turn voluntary standards into
constraints on regulatory authority), knowledge production
(generating and disseminating ideas, information and expertise about
the design, use or value of voluntary initiatives), reward (providing
material incentives for adherence to voluntary initiatives through
regulatory relief programs, financial incentives or "green"
government procurement policies), command (issuing legally binding
requirements to adhere to voluntary initiatives through court orders
or legislation), benchmarking (using voluntary initiatives as
benchmarks for determining legal liability), challenge (challenging
firms or other organizations to adhere to voluntary initiatives) and
borrowing (incorporating voluntary initiatives into legal instruments
such as statutes and regulations).
Second, the tendency to reinforce received conceptual
dichotomies and to ask a limited set of questions about EMS
initiatives discourages consideration of EMS initiatives as a form of
government in their own right. Rather than asking what the
relationship between EMSs and governments ought to be, it might be
more interesting to ask how EMSs and EMS standards, in their
complex interplay with state actors and apparatuses, operate as a
2002-2003]
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mode of government with their own normative rationales and
mundane technologies of rule. The extensive imbrication of public
and private authority revealed by my research suggests the need for
an alternative conception of "government" that moves beyond the
metaphor of a public-private divide, one that considers government
to include the entire array of ideas, goals and techniques by which a
diversity of authorities, state and non-state, seek to shape human
conduct to desired ends. I suggest that Michel Foucault's idea of
"governmentality" is a fruitful starting point for this effort to rethink
government. It leads us to pay special attention to the mundane
technologies employed by authorities to govern conduct and to
acknowledge that these technologies have crucial political
implications. I argue in this connection that the techniques of EMSs
and standardization deactivate the substantial political stakes of
corporate environmental management by treating them as "technical"
matters to be resolved by neutral professional expertise and
simultaneously as "private" matters of consumer or commercial
preference to be resolved by the market. This is true of EMS
initiatives whether pursued by the private sector or at the prompting
of public authorities. By transforming struggles over environmental
harms, jobs, profits, etc. into matters of managerial expertise and
market preference, the technologies of environmental management
systems disguise their own role in the creation and reproduction of
power relations.
Furthermore, considering EMSs as a mode of "government"
leads us to explore what Foucault calls political rationalities, the
discursive fields within which the forms and goals of government, the
appropriate boundaries between state, market and society and the
proper roles of public and other authorities are conceptualized and
justified. The political rationalities of EMSs and EMS standards
consist of a particular set ofjustifications and story-lines that vest the
development and implementation of important environmental
standards in global standardization bodies, business firms,
consultancies and private certification and accreditation bodies and
justify a particular distribution of authority among firms, markets,
employees, citizens and public authorities on the basis of good
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business sense, managerial rationality, individual employee
responsibility, autonomous consumer choice, the limits of the admini-
strative state and the ultimate pursuit of sustainable development.
This analysis of the governmental rationalities and techniques
of EMSs and the interpenetration of "public" and "private" authorities
in the politics of environmental management casts new light on the
debate over what role EMSs should play in public law and policy. I
therefore conclude the article with some tentative thoughts on what
role law might play in this arena-in particular, how it might be
employed to resist the tendency of EMS-based initiatives to "de-
politicize" environmental politics.
The article is structured as follows. In Part I, I describe
environmental management systems and EMS standards. In Part II,
I discuss briefly the existing literature on this subject. In Part III, I
present a typology of public authorities' engagements with EMS
initiatives, illustrated with reference to the Canadian experience. In
Part IV I argue that the interpenetration of public and private
authority in the field of EMS suggests an alternative conception of
"government," building on Foucault's idea of "govemmentality".
This analysis has two parts. First, I examine EMSs and organized
standardization as governmental technologies, and second, I explore
the political rationalities of EMS. Finally, in Part V I make
suggestions about the possible roles of law and lawyers in
(re)defining the political stakes of environmental management.
2002-20031
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Part I: The Development and Standardization of
Environmental Management Systemst'
Environmental management systems emerged as a distinct
management tool in the late 1980s in the wake of several prominent
environmental disasters including the chemical disaster at Bhopal,
India and the Exxon Valdez spill in Alaska. These disasters were
accompanied by increasingly negative publicity and pressures for
increasingly stringent environmental regulation in a number of leading
industries. A growing number of firms, among them many large
multinational corporations, expanded and consolidated their existing
environmental management tools (e.g., environmental policies,
environmental audits, public environmental reports and pollution
prevention programs) into systematic programs to manage the
environmental impacts of their operations. An EMS is a system of
management policies, procedures, structures and practices that enables
an organization to anticipate, identify and manage the environmental
impacts of its activities. The major elements of an EMS include a
I Useful accounts of the history and rationales of environmental
management systems and EMS standardization include Eric W. Orts, Reflexive
Environmental Law, 89 Nw. U. L. REV. 1227, 1287-1311 (1995); Naomi Roht-
Arriaza, Shifting the Point of Regulation: The International Organization for
Standardization and Global Lawmaking on Trade and the Environment, 22
ECOLOGY L.Q. 479,489-515 (1995) [hereinafter Roht- Arriaza, Shifting the Point
of Regulation]; THE ISO 14000 HANDBOOK 4-23 (Joseph Cascio ed., 1996)
[hereinafter Cascio, THE ISO 14000 HANDBOOK]; Kerry E. Rodgers, The ISO
Environmental Standards Initiative, 5 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 181 (1996); Christopher
H. Bell, The ISO 14001 Environmental Management Systems Standard: A Modest
Perspective, 27 ENVTL. L. REP. 10622 (1997) [hereinafter Bell, The ISO 14001
EMS Standard: A Modest Perspective]; ISO 14001 AND BEYOND:
ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS IN THE REAL WORLD (Christopher
Sheldon, ed., 1997); Errol Meidinger, 'Private'Environmental Regulation, Human
Rights, and Community, 7 BUFF. ENVTL. L.J. 123, 183-198 (1999-2000)
[hereinafter Meidinger, 'Private 'Environmental Regulation]; REGULATING FROM
THE INSIDE: CAN ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS ACHIEVE POLICY
GOALS? (Cary Coglianese & Jennifer Nash eds., 2001) [hereinafter COGLIANESE
& NASH, REGULATING FROM THE INSIDE].
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written environmental policy setting out the organization's
environmental vision and basic commitments; aplanning process to
evaluate the organization's environmental impacts, identify applicable
legal requirements and set environmental objectives and targets;
implementation of the EMS through roles, responsibilities, resources,
training, communication, documentation and operational controls;
checking of the organization's performance through regular
monitoring, measurement and audits along with corrective action to
remedy any problems; and regular top management review to make
any improvements to the EMS needed to ensure its continuing
suitability and effectiveness.
The thinking behind EMS is that poor environmental
performance can usually be traced to failure of a firm's management
systems, rather than solely to failures of individual managers or
employees, and that improved management processes will lead to
improved environmental outcomes. The continuous EMS cycle of
planning, implementation, checking, corrective action and review
(also known as the Deming circle or "Plan-Do-Check-Act" model) is
meant to result in continual improvement of the management system
and, ultimately, the organization's environmental performance.
Implementation of an EMS does not require or guarantee any
particular level of environmental performance; rather, it provides a
system by which an organization can identify and achieve environ-
mental performance goals set within the organization or elsewhere.
Environmental management systems leave it up to each organization
to identify its own environmental performance objectives in
accordance with its needs and interests.
By the early 1990s many firms based in the advanced
industrialized countries supported the development of uniform
standards for EMSs to enable comparability and create a level playing
field for trade. Standardization bodies in several jurisdictions took up
this challenge and began to develop voluntary EMS standards. The
first national EMS standard to be published was the British Standards
Institution's BS 7750 standard, in 1992. The European Community
followed shortly with its own voluntary Eco-Management and Audit
Scheme (EMAS) in 1993. EMAS took effect in 1995, whereupon
2002-2003]
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existing national standards, including BS 7750, were withdrawn by
member countries. In 1993, spurred partly by the 1992 Rio Earth
Summit's call for global business to contribute to the attainment of
sustainable development and partly by the incipient proliferation of
EMS standards, ISO established a new Technical Committee, TC 207,
to develop voluntary global standards for corporate environmental
management. These standards, known as the ISO 14000 series,
quickly emerged as the most prominent EMS standardization
initiatives. The series, which was published between 1996 and 1999,
consists of ISO 14001 (which specifies requirements for an EMS that
may be objectively audited and certified), ISO 14004 (a more detailed
and flexible EMS guide not intended for certification purposes), and
a score of supporting standards and guides relating to environmental
auditing, environmental performance evaluation, environmental
labeling and product life cycle analysis.'
Beyond implementing an EMS for their own internal purposes,
many organizations wish to demonstrate to relevant external
audiences (e.g., customers, trade associations, consumers or
regulators) that their EMS conforms to a recognized standard. This is
typically achieved by having the EMS certified as conforming to ISO
14001 or another recognized standard (e.g., EMAS) by an accredited
third-party registrar (known as a verifier in EMAS parlance).
Independent third-party certification has long been used to verify
conformance to technical product safety or performance standards. In
recent years it has been extended to a broader range of environmental,
labor, social and other initiatives such as product ecolabeling
2 The two EMS standards are ISO 14001:1996, ENVIRONMENTAL
MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS: SPECIFICATION WITH GUIDANCE FOR USE (Geneva: ISO,
1996); and ISO 14004:1996, ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS-
GENERAL GUIDELINES ON PRINCIPLES, SYSTEMS AND SUPPORTING TECHNIQUES
(Geneva: ISO, 1996). Both are currently being revised, with publication of second
generation standards expected in 2003 or 2004.
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programs,3 sustainable resource management programs4 and
environmental, quality or occupational health and safety management
system standards, including ISO 14001.
EMSs have spread rapidly through the private sector in recent
years, particularly among multinational corporations and corporations
operating in international markets. The number of ISO 14001
certificates worldwide has grown rapidly in the last few years,
reaching around 36,000 by January 2002.' The total number of
organizations with EMSs that have either not pursued certification or
are certified to another EMS standard is likely to be much higher. A
growing number of multinational corporations, including, notably, the
major auto manufacturers, require their suppliers to have ISO 14001
EMSs in place, although they do not necessarily require third party
certification. EMS implementation or certification is slowly becoming
a de facto requirement for doing business in a handful of industry
sectors and international markets.
Part II: The State of EMS Scholarship
While they have received relatively little scholarly attention
compared to some other corporate greening initiatives, EMSs and
EMS standards are the subject of a quickly growing academic
literature concentrated mainly in management studies, economics and
policy studies. They have not attracted much attention from the legal
academy, although there is a small and growing body of legal
scholarship on the subject. Academic interest in EMSs began to arise
3 Ecolabeling programs may apply across a range of products, like the US
EPA's Energy Star program or Environment Canada's Environmental Choice program,
or they may product-specific, like ecolabels for bananas, coffee or forest products.
4 The most prominent such programs are the Forest Stewardship Council's
program for certifying sustainable forest management operations and the Marine
Stewardship Council's program for certifying sustainable fisheries management
operations.
5See Gergely T6th, The ISO 14001 Speedometer, at http://inem.org/htdocs
/iso/speedometer/speedo-0 1_2002.html (last visited Oct. 9, 2002) (presenting data
on ISO 14001 registrations for January 2002 and various dates back to 1999).
2002-2003]
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almost as soon as EMSs emerged as a distinct management tool in the
late 1980s. There was a flurry of academic interest in EMSs in the
mid-1990s with the development of the ISO 14000 standards and
EMAS, followed by a lull as EMSs spread quietly but rapidly through
the corporate community. Since the late 1990s there has been a
sustained surge of scholarly interest in EMSs, likely reflecting a
number of developments: the establishment of a substantial record of
experience with EMSs capable of supporting serious empirical
research into their drivers, effects, credibility, etc.; the remarkably
rapid growth of interest in EMSs among industry, reflected in the
number of EMAS- and ISO 14001 -registered organizations world-
wide; the increasing interest in EMSs on the part of governments and
intergovernmental organizations, manifested in the rapid proliferation
of legal and policy initiatives aiming to incorporate EMSs into
governmental regulatory strategies;6 the recently completed revision
of EMAS and the ongoing revision of ISO 14001 and ISO 14004; and
a slowly increasing awareness among policy makers of the potential
significance of international standards and standardization bodies
under international trade agreements.7
The existing academic literature on EMSs, and, for that matter,
other corporate greening initiatives, has two features which limit its
usefulness for exploring the full range of implications of these
experiments in corporate environmental responsibility.8 The first
feature is a tendency to ask a limited range of questions about these
initiatives and their implications. The second is a tendency to
reproduce received conceptual dichotomies between public and
private, state and non-state, mandatory and voluntary, and so on.
While the existing literature has made substantial contributions to our
knowledge of important aspects of environmental management
6 See infra, Part IlI.
7 See infra, notes 106-109 and accompanying text.
8 The following account focuses mainly on the legal literature on EMSs and
EMS standards, but also includes some of the literature on EMSs and EMS
standards that has emerged in other fields such as economics, environmental
studies, management and policy studies.
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systems and corporate greening, these two features prevent a fuller
appreciation of the subtle and complex interpenetration of "public"
and "private" actors and regulatory systems. They also discourage
more imaginative inquiry into how we govern and are governed in the
field of environmental management.
The Limited Range of Questions Asked
My purpose in this article is not to stake out a position in the
existing debates about EMSs and EMS standards, at least not directly.
I do not seek to evaluate the literature in terms of the merits of
methods employed, findings reached, arguments advanced and
positions taken. Rather, what intrigues me most about the existing
literature on EMSs and EMS standards is how it defines the relevant
questions to ask. One of the most salient features of the existing
literature, and one of its most important limitations, is found in the
questions it asks about EMSs and EMS standards, not so much in the
answers reached nor in the methods used to reach them.
In short, the existing literature poses a limited range of
questions about EMSs and EMS standards. To a first approximation,
the existing literature poses five types of questions about EMSs and
EMS standards: questions of success andfailure, power, legitimacy,
motivations and drivers, and design.9 Within this constellation of
questions, the legal literature lays particular emphasis on questions of
design, in particular the question of what should be the relationship
between EMSs, on one hand, and law and public policy, on the other.
9 A number of caveats are in order. First, this characterization is not, of
course, exhaustive, although I maintain that it adequately describes the large
majority of the legal EMS literature. Second, the sample questions I present below
are not always posed explicitly in the sources cited, but where they are not, they
can be fairly implied from the context. Finally, the five types of questions are not
mutually exclusive, but overlap considerably. Thus, for example, questions of the
success or failure of EMS standards are very closely related to questions about
their legitimacy and design. In some cases, therefore, the different types of
questions I identify may be different ways of asking the same questions.
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1. Success and Failure
First, much of the existing literature is concerned with
questions of the success and failure of EMSs and EMS initiatives,
such as:
Questions of how to define success and failure, e.g. how
should success or failure of an EMS or EMS standard be measured?10
Questions of efficiency, e.g. do the benefits of an EMS
outweigh its costs? Does implementation of an EMS lead to cost
savings, more efficient operations or increased productivity? Will
implementation of EMSs by industry reduce governments' policy
development and enforcement costs? Will EMSs and EMS standards
avoid or promote policy capture, externalization of social costs, free-
riding and other market distortions and collective action problems?"
Are EMS standards anti-competitive? Will they raise non-tariff
10 See, e.g., EUROPEAN PARTNERS FOR THE ENVIRONMENT &
SUSTAINABILITY LTD., FROM EMAS TO SMAS: CHARTING THE COURSE FROM
ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT AND AUDITING TO SUSTAINABILITY MANAGEMENT
(1996) [hereinafter EPE/Sustainability]; Andrea Spencer-Cooke, From EMAS to
SMAS: Charting the Course from Environmental Management to Sustainability,
in SHELDON, ISO 14001 AND BEYOND, supra note 2, 243.
11 On this and the preceding questions in this paragraph, see, e.g., Bell, The
ISO 14001 EMS Standard: A Modest Perspective, supra note 2; Anthony Reiley,
The New Paradigm: 1SO 14000 and its Place in Regulatory Reform, 22 J. CORP.
L 535, (1997); Tim J. Sunderland, Environmental Management Standards and
Certification: Do They Add Value?, in SHELDON, ISO 14001 AND BEYOND, supra
note 2, 127; Amy Pesapane Lally, ISO 14000 and Environmental CostAccounting:
the Gateway to the Global Market, 29 LAW AND POL'Y INT'L BUS. 501 (1998);
Richard Starkey, The Standardization ofEnvironmental Management Systems: ISO
14001, ISO 14004 and EMAS, in I CORPORATE ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT:
SYSTEMS AND STRATEGIES 61 (Richard Welford ed., 2d ed. 1998); Jason Morrison
et al., Managing a Better Environment: Opportunities and Obstacles for ISO
14001 in Public Policy and Commerce (2000), available at http://www.pacinst.org
(last visited Nov. 25, 2002).
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barriers to international trade? 2
Questions of consequential effectiveness, e.g. do EMSs or
EMS standards result in improved environmental performance and
pollution prevention? 3 Do they promote sustainable development?"
12 On the questions of anti-competitiveness and trade barriers, see, e.g.,
Rodgers, supra note 2, at 186; EPE/SustainAbility, supra note 11; Spencer-Cooke,
supra note 11; Roht-Arriaza, Shifting the Point of Regulation, supra note 2; Naomi
Roht-Arriaza, Developing Countries, Regional Organizations, and the ISO 14001
Environmental Management Standard, 9 GEO. INT'LENVTL. L. REV. 583 (1997)
[hereinafter Roht-Arriaza, Developing Countries, Regional Organizations]; Aidan
Davy, Environmental Management Systems: ISO 14001 Issues for Developing
Countries, in SHELDON, ISO 14001 AND BEYOND, supra note 2, 169; Kerstin
Pfliegner, International Voluntary Standards-The Potential for Trade Barriers,
in ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS ANDCLEANER PRODUCTION 37 (Ruth
Hillary, ed., 1997); Harris Gleckman & Riva Krut, Neither International Nor
Standard: The Limits of ISO 14001 as an instrument of Global Corporate
Environmental Management, in SHELDON, ISO 14001 AND BEYOND, supra note 2,
45; RIVA KRUT & HARRIS GLECKMAN, 1SO 14001: A MISSED OPPORTUNITY FOR
SUSTAINABLE GLOBAL INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT (1998); Lally, supra note 12;
WORLD WILDLIFE FUND, ISO INSIDE OUT: ISO AND ENVIRONMENTAL
MANAGEMENT (1996); Morrison et al., supra note 12.
13 See, e.g., Donna Solen, ISO 1400 Emerging International Environmental
Law, 10 FLA. J. INT'L L. 275 (1995); WORLD WILDLIFE FUND, supra note 13; Roht-
Arriaza, Developing Countries, Regional Organizations, supra note 13; Bell, The
ISO 14001 EMS Standard: A Modest Perspective, supra note 2; Christopher Bell,
The ISO 14001 Environmental Management Systems Standard: One American's
View, in SHELDON, ISO 14001 AND BEYOND, supra note 2, 61 [hereinafter Bell,
The ISO 14001 EMS Standard: One American's View]; HILLARY, ENVIRONMENTAL
MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS AND CLEANER PRODUCTION, supra note 13; John Wolfe,
Drivers for International Integrated Environmental Management, in id., 15
[hereinafter Wolfe, Drivers for International Integrated Environmental
Management]; Sunderland, supra note 12; Alan Netherwood, Environmental
Management Systems, in WELFORD, CORPORATE ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT,
supra note 12, 37; Gleckman & Krut, supra note 13; KRUT & GLECKMAN,
supra note 13; Lally, supra note 12; Meidinger, 'Private' Environmental
Regulation, supra note 2; Morrison et al. supra note 12. One of the most ambitious
efforts to study the effects of EMS implementation on firms' environmental,
economic and legal performance is the National Database on Environmental
Management Systems (NDEMS) developed by the University of North Carolina
2002-2003]
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Do they improve or assure compliance with applicable laws? 5 Do
they promote the implementation of existing international
environmental agreements? 6 Do they improve a corporation's public
image?17 Do they improve an organization's competitiveness? 8 Do
they contribute to the protection of human rights? 9 Do they promote
at Chapel Hill and the Environmental Law Institute with support from the US
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the Multi-State Working Group on
EMS (MSWG), a nationwide consortium of government, business, academic and
NGO representatives. The NDEMS project gathers and analyzes data on EMS
implementation in more than 50 participating industry, institutional and government
facilities. Information on the project is available online at
http://www.eli.org/isopilots.htm (last visited Nov. 25, 2002). See Richard N.L.
Andrews et al., Environmental Management Systems: History, Theory and
Implementation Research, in COGLIANESE & NASH, REGULATING FROM THE INSIDE,
supra note 2, 31.
14 See, e.g., EPE/SustainAbility, supra note 11; Rodgers, supra note 2;
SHELDON, ISO 14001 AND BEYOND, supra note 2; Netherwood, supra note 14;
KRUT & GLECKMAN, supra note 13; Douglas Taylor, Is ISO 14001 Standardization
in Tune with Sustainable Development?, 13 J. ENVTL. L & LITIG. 509 (1998)
[hereinafter Taylor, Standardization in Tune]; Meidinger, 'Private 'Environmental
Regulation, supra note 2; Morrison et al., supra note 12.
Is See, e.g., Sunderland, supra note 12; Starkey, supra note 12; Meidinger,
'Private' Environmental Regulation, supra note 2; Bell, The ISO 14001 EMS
Standard. A Modest Perspective, supra note 2; Bell, The ISO 14001 EMS
Standard: One American's View, supra note 14; Lally, supra note 12; Morrison et
al., supra note 12; Dianne Saxe, ISO 14001/14004 and Compliance in Canada
(Dec. 2000) (unpublished manuscript prepared for Canadian Standards
Association, on file with author).
16 See, e.g., Gleckman & Krut, supra note 13; KRUT & GLECKMAN, supra
note 13; Lally, supra note 12.
17 See, e.g., EPE/SustainAbility, supra note 11; Spencer-Cooke, supra note
11.
18 See, e.g., WELFORD, CORPORATE ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT, supra
note 12; Lally, supra note 12; Hillary, ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS
AND CLEANER PRODUCTION, supra note 13; Davy, supra note 13.
19 See, e.g., Meidinger, 'Private' Environmental Regulation, supra note 2.
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the transformation of corporate culture?2° Do they have an impact on
consumer or citizen beliefs and behavior?2'
Questions of the conditions for success or failure, e.g. what
internal and external factors limit or enhance the effectiveness of an
EMS or EMS standard? In particular, what are the conditions for
successful implementation and performance of EMSs in small and
medium sized enterprises (SMEs)? 22
2. Power
Another common set of questions in the EMS literature
concerns power, domination and exclusion. These questions are
usually raised by critics of EMSs and EMS standards but are also
addressed by numerous proponents. Typical questions in this vein
include:
Who has power in the development and implementation of
EMSs and EMS standards?
Which actors and interests are dominant and which are
excluded, subordinated or marginalized?
Do EMS standards development processes or the content of
20 See, e.g., Orts, supra note 2; SHELDON, ISO 14001 AND BEYOND, supra
note 2; Netherwood, supra note 14; Paulette Stenzel, Can the ISO 14000 Series
Environmental Standards Provide a Viable Alternative to Governmental
Regulation?, 37 AM. Bus. L.J. 237 (2000).
21 See, e.g., Judith Petts, Managing Public Expectations and Information
Needs, in ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS I (Paul Sharratt ed., 1995);
Andrew Blaza & Nicky Chambers, Environmental Management Standards: Who
Cares?, in SHELDON, ISO 14001 AND BEYOND, supra note 2, 197.
22 See, e.g., EPE/SustainAbility, supra note 11; Hillary, ENVIRONMENTAL
MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS AND CLEANER PRODUCTION, supra note 13,307-346; Ruth
Hillary, Environmental Management Standards: What do SMEs Think, in
SHELDON, ISO 14001 AND BEYOND, supra note 2, 333 [hereinafter Hillary, What
do SMEs Think?]; Spencer-Cooke, supra note I1; Netherwood, supra note 14;
Donal O'Laoire & Richard Welford, The EMS in the SME, in WELFORD,
CORPORATE ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT, supra note 12, 199.
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EMS standards disadvantage particular actors such as
developing countries, public interest NGOs, SMEs, govern-
ments or the public? 3
3. Legitimacy
A third set of questions concerns the legitimacy of EMSs,
EMS standards and the processes by which they are developed and
implemented. I use the term legitimacy to encompass a range of
interrelated concerns about trust, credibility, transparency and
accountability, such as:
Are EMSs and EMS standards credible to the business
community? Are they credible to relevant external audiences
or are they seen as a species of"greenwash"? Are they open to
abuse by self-serving firms?24
Do EMS standards set substantive environmental performance
requirements? Are environmental performance goals specific
23 See, e.g., WORLD WILDLIFE FUND, supra note 13; Rodgers, supra note 2;
David Bennett, Beware ISO, NEW SOLUTIONS, Spring 1997; Hillary,
ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS AND CLEANER PRODUCTION, supra note
13; Hillary, What do SMEs Think?, supra note 23; KRUT & GLECKMAN, supra note
13; Roht-Arriaza, Shifting the Point of Regulation, supra note 2, at 523 ("who are
the drafters?"), Roht-Arriaza, Developing Countries, Regional Organizations,
supra note 13; Jennifer Clapp, The Privatization of Global Environmental
Governance: ISO 14000 and the Developing World, 4 GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 295
(1998); Morrison et al., supra note 12.
24 See, e.g., Rodgers, supra note 2; WORLD WILDLIFE FUND, supra note 13;
Bell, The ISO 14001 EMS Standard: A Modest Perspective, supra note 2; Bell, The
ISO 14001 EMS Standard. One American's View, supra note 14; CANADIAN
INSTITUTE FOR ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY, CSA ENVIRONMENTAL
STANDARDS WRITING: BARRIERS TO ENVIRONMENTAL NON-GOVERNMENTAL
ORGANIZATIONS INVOLVEMENT (1997) [hereinafter CIELAP]; Christopher
Sheldon, Introduction, in SHELDON, ISO 14001 AND BEYOND, supra note 2, I1
[hereinafter Sheldon, Introduction]; Bennett, supra note 24; Netherwood, supra
note 14; Morrison et al., supra note 12.
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and measurable? How ambitious are they? How is perfo-
rmance monitored and measured?"
Do ISO 1400's treatment of "continual improvement" of the
EMS, "commitment to compliance" with legal requirements
and "prevention of pollution" enhance or detract from the
standard's credibility?26
Does the credibility of an EMS depend on auditing or
certification by an independent third party? What or who will
ensure the consistency, competence, integrity and impartiality
of EMS auditors and certifiers?27
Do EMSs or EMS standards promote or hinder public trans-
parency and accountability of corporate environmental
performance? Do they rely on one-way information
dissemination or promote genuine public consultation and
participation?28
25 See, e.g., WORLD WILDLIFE FUND, supra note 13; Hillary,
ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS AND CLEANER PRODUCTION, supra note
13; KRUT & GLECKMAN, supra note 13.
26 See, e.g., Roht-Arriaza, Developing Countries, Regional Organizations,
supra note 13; Bell, The ISO 14001 EMS Standard: A Modest Perspective, supra
note 2; Bell, The ISO 14001 EMS Standard: One American's View, supra note 14;
Lally, supra note 12; Morrison et al., supra note 12.
27 See, e.g., Roht-Arriaza, Developing Countries, Regional Organizations,
supra note 13, at 600 ("The credibility of ISO 14001 ...hinges on the credibility of
the certification"); EPE/SustainAbility, supra note 11; Spencer-Cooke, supra note
11; Wolfe, Driversfor International IntegratedEnvironmental Management, supra
note 14; Jeff Dowson, Environmental Management System Certification-An
Assessor's View, in HILLARY, ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS AND
CLEANER PRODUCTION, supra note 13, 173; Roger Brockway, Certification and
Harmonization of Environmental Management Systems, in id, 183; Davy, supra
note 13; Sunderland, supra note 12; Sheldon, Introduction, supra note 25, at 15;
Lally, supra note 12; Meidinger, 'Private'Environmental Regulation, supra note
2; Stenzel, supra note 21; Morrison et al., supra note 12.
28 See, e.g., Petts, supra note 22; Rodgers, supra note 2; WORLD WILDLIFE
FUND, supra note 13; Bell, The ISO 14001 EMS Standard: A Modest Perspective,
supra note 2; Bell, The ISO 14001 EMS Standard: One American's View, supra
note 14; Roht-Arriaza, Developing Countries, Regional Organizations, supra note
13; Neil Gunningham, Environmental Management Systems and Community
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Are standards development bodies and processes (especially
in ISO) legitimate? Should they have more transparency and
accountability and if so, to whom? Does the consensus process
common to most standardization bodies lead to "lowest
common denominator" standards? Should public interest
NGOs participate in EMS standardization? 29
4. Motivations and Drivers
A fourth set of questions concerns the motivations and drivers
for the implementation of EMSs and the development of EMS
standards. Such questions include:
What factors motivate or drive an organization or its leaders
to implement or obtain certification of an EMS? What might
industry, governments and other actors expect to gain or lose
by developing EMS standards? What factors drive or hinder
the development of EMS standards?3"
Participation: Rethinking Chemical Industry Regulation, 16 U.C.L.A.J. ENVTL. L.
& POL'Y 319 (1997-98); Meidinger, 'Private' Environmental Regulation, supra
note 2; Morrison et al., supra note 12; Stenzel, supra note 21; HILLARY,
ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS AND CLEANER PRODUCTION, supra note
13; Blaza & Chambers, supra note 22; Gleckman & Krut, supra note 13.
29 See, e.g., Roht-Arriaza, Shifting the Point of Regulation, supra note 2;
Roht-Arriaza, Developing Countries, Regional Organizations, supra note 13;
Rodgers, supra note 2; Davy, supra note 13; Gleckman & Krut, supra note 13;
KRUT & GLECKMAN, supra note 13; Meidinger, 'Private' Environmental
Regulation, supra note 2; Stenzel, supra note 21; CIELAP, supra note 25; WORLD
WILDLIFE FUND, supra note 13; Bennett, supra note 24; Morrison et al., supra note
12.
30 See, e.g., Solen, supra note 14; Rodgers, supra note 2; Wolfe, Drivers for
International Integrated Environmental Management, supra note 14; Sunderland,
supra note 12; Phillip Sutton, Targeting Sustainability: The Positive Application
of ISO 14001, in SHELDON, 1SO 14001 AND BEYOND, supra note 2, 211; Davy,
supra note 13; Stenzel, supra note 21; Aseem Prakash, A New-Institutionalist
Perspective on ISO 14000 and Responsible Care, 8 Bus. STRATEGY & ENV'T. 322
(1999); COGLIANESE & NASH, REGULATING FROM THE INSIDE, supra note 2.
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Factors typically identified in the literature include anticipated
cost savings or increased revenues;3 the costs of implementing and
maintaining and EMS or developing EMS standards;32 compliance
with existing environmental laws, the threat of more stringent laws or
the prospect of avoiding new laws or obtaining more favorable
regulatory treatment;33 enhanced competitive advantage or threat of
competitive disadvantage; 34 enhanced public image or threat of
adverse publicity; 35 the presence or absence of free-rider incentives for
firms not to participate in EMS implementation or standardization;36
pressures from customers, suppliers, trade associations, creditors,
insurers, investors, consumers or employees; 37 pressures from
environmental or other activists; 38 and adoption of an ethical
commitment to improve corporate environmental performance.39
31 See, e.g., Lally, supra note 12; Nicholas A. Ashford, The Influence of
Information-based Initiatives and Negotiated Environmental Agreements on
Technological Change, in VOLUNTARY APPROACHES IN ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY
137, 143 (Carlo Carraro & Frangois Ldvdque, eds., 1999); Stenzel, supra note 21.
32 See, e.g., Starkey, supra note 12; Stenzel, supra note 21.
33 See, e.g., Bell, The ISO 14001 EMS Standard: A Modest Perspective,
supra note 2; Bell, The ISO 14001 EMS Standard: One American's View, supra
note 14; Ridgway M. Hall Jr. & Kristine A. Tockman, International Corporate
Environmental Compliance and Auditing Programs, 25 ENVTL L. REP 10395
(1995); Netherwood, supra note 14; Starkey, supra note 12; Stenzel, supra note 21;
COGLIANESE & NASH, REGULATING FROM THE INSIDE, supra note 2.
34 See, e.g., VIRGINIA HAUFLER, A PUBLIC ROLE FOR THE PRIVATE SECTOR:
INDUSTRY SELF-REGULATION IN A GLOBAL ECONOMY (2001), WELFORD,
CORPORATE ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT, supra note 12; HILLARY,
ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS AND CLEANER PRODUCTION, supra note
13; Lally, supra note 12.
35 See, e.g., Haufler, supra note 35.
36 See, e.g., Blaza & Chambers, supra note 22, at 201.
37 See, e.g. WELFORD, CORPORATE ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT, supra
note 12; Blaza & Chambers, supra note 22; Davy, supra note 13; Lally, supra note
12; Starkey, supra note 12; Stenzel, supra note 21.
38 See, e.g., Petts, supra note 22; Haufler, supra note 35; Stenzel, supra note
21.
39 See, e.g., WELFORD, CORPORATE ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT, supra
note 12.
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5. Design
A fifth category of questions, and one that has attracted
perhaps the most attention from lawyers and legal academics,
concerns the design of EMSs, EMS standards and standardization
institutions, and their relation to other environmental governance
systems. These are expressly normative and prescriptive questions.
Questions in this category fall roughly into four types:
Practical EMS design guidance, e.g., how should
organizations design, implement and maintain an EMS?4 0
Questions of reform of EMSs and EMS standards, e.g.
whether and how EMSs or EMS standards should be made
more efficient, effective, credible, transparent, accountable,
legitimate, etc.; what lies "beyond ISO 14001 "?4
Questions ofreform ofstandards development institutions and
processes, e.g., how should standards development institutions
and processes be designed or reformed?42
40 Representative sources cover a wide range from practical how-to manuals
for business managers to sophisticated scholarly and professional analysis of EMS
implementation issues, e.g. BRIAN ROTHERY, BS 7750: IMPLEMENTING THE
ENVIRONMENT MANAGEMENT STANDARD AND THE EC ECO-MANAGEMENT
SCHEME (1993); ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS (Paul Sharratt ed.,
1995); Cascio, THE ISO 14000 HANDBOOK, supra note 2; JOSEPH CASCIO ET AL.,
ISO 14000 GUIDE (1996); RICHARD B. CLEMENTS, COMPLETE GUIDE TO ISO 14000
(1996); W.M. VON ZHAREN, ISO 14000: UNDERSTANDING THE ENVIRONMENTAL
STANDARDS (1996); PERRY JOHNSON, ISO 14000: THE BUSINESS MANAGER'S
COMPLETE GUIDE TO ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT (1997); SHELDON, ISO
14001 AND BEYOND, supra note 2; TOM TIBOR & IRA FELDMAN, ISO 14000: A
GUIDE TO THE NEW ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT STANDARDS (1996); JOHN
VOORHEES & ROBERT A. WOELLNER, INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL RISK
MANAGEMENT: 1SO 14000 AND THE SYSTEMS APPROACH (1998), WELFORD,
CORPORATE ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT, supra note 12; ISO 14001: CASE
STUDIES AND PRACTICAL EXPERIENCE (Ruth Hillary ed., 200 1).
41 Sources in this vein are too numerous to mention. The phrase "beyond
ISO 14001" is borrowed from SHELDON, ISO 14001 AND BEYOND, supra note 2.
42 Again, sources in this vein are too numerous to mention.
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Questions of the appropriate relationship between "private"
and "public" regulatory systems, e.g., how, if at all, should
governments and intergovernmental organizations integrate
EMSs and EMS standards into their laws, policies and
programs? Can EMSs and EMS standards such as ISO 14000
provide a viable alternative or supplement to governmental
regulation, particularly "command and control" regulation?
Should EMSs be made legally mandatory? Should govern-
ments demand that EMSs meet extra requirements (e.g. "ISO
14001 Plus") before granting regulatory flexibility or relief?
What role should government actors play in EMS standardiza-
tion activities?4 3 Can EMS standards be used to enlist the
43 On this and the preceding questions in this paragraph, see, e.g.,
Gunningham, supra note 29; NEIL GUNNINGHAM & PETER GRABOSKY, SMART
REGULATION: DESIGNING ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY (1998) [hereinafter
GUNNINGHAM & GRABOSKY]; Rodgers, supra note 2; WORLD WILDLIFE FUND,
supra note 13; Scott Butner, ISO 14000-Policy and Regulatory Implications for
State Agencies, Presentation at National Pollution Prevention Roundtable Annual
Meeting (April 10, 1996), available at http://www.seattle.battelle.org/p2online/iso-
regs.htm (last visited June 21, 2001); Henry Balikov & Patrick Cavanaugh, The
Overselling of Government "Reinvention ": How Government Expectations of
EPA's Project XL and ISO 14000 May Prove Counter-Productive, 3 ALBANY
ENVIRONMENTAL OUTLOOK 23 (Spring-Summer 1997); CIELAP, supra note 25;
HILLARY, ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS AND CLEANER PRODUCTION,
supra note 13; SHELDON, ISO 14001 AND BEYOND, supra note 2; Reiley, supra
note 12; Solen, supra note 14; Roht-Arriaza, Shifting the Point of Regulation,
supra note 2; Naomi Roht-Arriaza, Private Voluntary Standard Setting, the
International Organization for Standardization, and International Environmental
Lawmaking, YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 105 (1995)
[hereinafter Roht-Arriaza, Private Voluntary Standard Setting]; Roht-Arriaza,
Developing Countries, Regional Organizations, supra note 13; Naomi Roht-
Arriaza, Environmental Management Systems andEnvironmental Protection: Can
ISO 14001 be Useful within the Context of APEC?, 6 J. ENV'T & DEVEL. 292
(1997); KRUT & GLECKMAN, supra note 13; Nancy Kubasek et al., Mandatory
Environmental Auditing: A Better Way to Secure Environmental Protection in the
United States and Canada, 18 J. LAND RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 261 (1998);
Meidinger, 'Private' Environmental Regulation, supra note 2; Paula C. Murray,
Inching Toward Regulatory Reform-ISO 14000: Much Ado About Nothing or a
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reflexive and self-regulatory capacities of social systems
outside the legal system in pursuit of environmental
protection?" What role should EMS standards and other
forms of transnational private ordering play in global environ-
mental protection?"
It is this last subset of questions that has sparked the most
interest among lawyers, legal academics and researchers in the field
of policy studies: how should these voluntary corporate stewardship
initiatives relate to law and public policy? In particular, there is
widespread interest in whether and to what extent EMSs might
supplement or replace conventional "command-and-control"
approaches to government environmental regulation. A common
theme in the literature is the proposition that the regulatory state and
the interstate system have inherently limited capacities to respond
effectively to contemporary economic, social and environmental crises
and may have already reached or exceeded those limits in many
Reinvention Tool?, 37 AM. Bus. L.J. 35 (1999); Stenzel, supra note 21; Morrison
et al., supra note 12; Keith Pezzoli, Environmental Management Systems (EMSs)
and Regulatory Innovation, 36 CAL. W.L. REV. 335 (2000); Errol Meidinger,
Environmental Certification Programs and US. EnvironmentalLaw: Closer Than
You May Think, 31 ENVTL L. REP. 10162 (2001) [hereinafter Meidinger, Closer
Than You May Think]; Saxe, supra note 16; Bell, The ISO 14001 EMS Standard:
A Modest Perspective, supra note 2; Bell, The ISO 14001 EMS Standard: One
American's View, supra note 14; Roy W. Shin & Yu-Che Chen, Seizing Global
Opportunities for Accomplishing Agencies'Missions: The Case of lSO 14000, 24
PUB. ADMIN. Q. 69 (2000); POLLUTION PROBE, THE FUTURE ROLE OF
ENVIRONMENTAL STANDARDS (2000); COGLIANESE & NASH, REGULATING FROM
THE INSIDE, supra note 2 (see especially Jerry Speir, EMSs and Tiered Regulation:
Getting the Deal Right, in id, 198); Haufler, supra note 35.
44 See, e.g., Orts, supra note 2.
45 See, e.g., Roht-Arriaza, Shifting the Point of Regulation, supra note 2;
Roht-Arriaza, Private Voluntary Standard Setting, supra note 44; Clapp, supra
note 24.
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cases.46 There is a widely shared sense that governmental and
intergovernmental regulation, whatever their strengths, have failed to
deliver the hoped-for environmental and social improvements or have
achieved improvements at excessive cost. It is widely thought that
state-based institutions are ultimately incapable, on their own, of
responding adequately to global environmental crises and globalized
economic forces. It is not uncommon for authors to employ the image
of conventional governmental regulation "break[ing] down under its
own weight".47 EMSs are often portrayed as an alternative form of
regulation which may supplement or replace conventional govern-
mental or international law and policy.4
While these themes of the limits of law and the potential of
"private" regulation to achieve social goals usually appear in the
context of domestic legal systems, they also appear frequently in
relation to the international legal system. The international system of
46 See, e.g., E.D. Elliott, Environmental TQM: Anatomy of a Pollution
Control Program That Works!, 92 MICH. L. REV. 1847 (1994); Orts, supra note 2;
Roht-Arriaza, Shifting the Point of Regulation, supra note 2; HILLARY,
ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS AND CLEANER PRODUCTION, supra note
13; Donal O'Laoire, Trade, Competitiveness and the Environment, in SHELDON,
ISO 14001 AND BEYOND, supra note 2, 109; Reiley, supra note 12; Balikov &
Cavanaugh, supra note 44; Gunningham, supra note 29; Lally, supra note 12;
Taylor, Standardization in Tune, supra note 15, Douglas Taylor, ISO 14000 and
Environmental Regulation, 9 J. ENVTL. L. & PRACTICE 1 (1999) [hereinafter
Taylor, Environmental Regulation]; Morrison et al., supra note 12; Murray, supra
note 44; Pezzoli, supra note 44; Stenzel, supra note 21; Kelly Kollman & Aseem
Prakash, Green By Choice? Cross-National Variations in Firms' Responses to
EMS-Based Environmental Regimes, 53 WORLD POL'Y 399 (2001); COGLIANESE
& NASH, REGULATING FROM THE INSIDE, supra note 2.
47 Orts, supra note 2, at 1241.
48 See, e.g., Orts, supra note 2; Roht-Arriaza, Shifting the Point of
Regulation, supranote 2; Roht-Arriaza, Private Voluntary Standard-Setting, supra
note 44; Butner, supra note 44; Rodgers, supra note 2; Balikov & Cavanaugh,
supra note 44; Reiley, supra note 12; Gunningham, supra note 29; Murray, supra
note 44; Taylor, Standardization in Tune, supra note 15; Taylor, Environmental
Regulation, supra note 47; Morrison et al., supra note 12; Pezzoli, supra note 44;
Stenzel, supra note 21; COGLIANESE & NASH, REGULATING FROM THE INSIDE,
supra note 2.
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interstate diplomacy, formal intergovernmental organizations and
international law is often portrayed as cumbersome, rigid, bloated,
unresponsive and unable to cope with the nimble forces of
globalization and the mounting challenges of social inequity and
environmental degradation. Roht-Arriaza suggests, for example, that
the regulatory system of public international law "may have become
anachronistic at best"." "Private" regulatory systems such as ISO
14000 are frequently portrayed as potentially heralding a new model
of global governance.5"
All of this is not to suggest, of course, that there is consensus
in the EMS literature as to the status and role of the state and the
interstate system. On the contrary, there is serious controversy over
the role governments and intergovernmental arrangements play or
ought to play in achieving desired social and environmental futures.
At a minimum, however, there is a widely shared sense that state and
intergovernmental interventions cannot, on their own, suffice to meet
the current social, economic and ecological crises. Debate rages over
the implications of this conclusion, in particular whether conventional
state and intergovernmental intervention simply need to be
supplemented by EMSs and other "private sector" regulation, or need
to be rolled back, replaced or thoroughly transformed by them.5
49 Roht-Arriaza, Shifting the Point of Regulation, supra note 2, at 485.
so See, e.g., id This idea was expressed colorfully by Jonathan Lash,
President of the World Resources Institute, in a statement on the recent
Johannesburg World Summit on Sustainable Development: "This Summit will be
remembered ... for the first stirrings of a new way of governing the global
commons, the beginnings of a shift from the stiff formal waltz of traditional
diplomacy to the jazzier dance of improvisational solution oriented partnerships
that may include non-government organizations, willing governments and other
stakeholders." Jonathan Lash, president of the World Resources Institute, E-mail
message on the results of the Johannesburg Summit (Sept. 5 2002) (widely
distributed via E-mail; copy on file with author).
51 In this regard, the EMS literature is closely connected with wider debates
about regulatory "reinvention" and the role of voluntary initiatives generally in
public law and policy. See, e.g., Cass Sunstein, Paradoxes of the Regulatory State,
57 U. CHi. L. REV. 407 (1990); CASS SUNSTEIN, AFTER THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION:
RECONCEIVING THE REGULATORY STATE (1990); DAVID OSBORNE AND TED
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6. Questions Not Asked
The existing EMS literature gives priority to questions of the
success, failure, legitimacy or illegitimacy, power dynamics, drivers
and design of environmental management initiatives. In this way it is
typical of much contemporary analysis of law and politics, which
tends to ask such questions as "Who governs?" "Who has power?"
"What is the source of their power or authority?" "What makes it
legitimate or illegitimate?" "What is the relationship between
governors and governed?" and "What makes a particular exercise of
power or instance of government a success or failure?"52 These are
important questions. Nevertheless I do not intend to pursue them for
two reasons. First, they have been and will continue to be well
canvassed elsewhere. Second, and more importantly, studies that take
these questions as their starting point assume that there is a pre-
existing division between those who have power and those who are its
targets, between governors and subjects and between subjugation and
liberation, and that a central task for analysis is to uncover these
divisions. Prevailing approaches to the study of government, law and
politics presuppose, in other words, a sort of political a priori in the
form of the distribution of power and location of rule."
An alternative approach would reject any such political a
priori by asking instead "how we govern" and "how we are
governed".5 4 Rather than presupposing an a priori distribution of
GAEBLER, REINVENTING GOVERNMENT (1992); IAN AYRES AND JOHN
BRAITHWAITE, RESPONSIVE REGULATION: TRANSCENDING THE DEREGULATION
DEBATE (1992); GUNNINGHAM & GRABOSKY, supra note 44; VOLUNTARY
INITIATIVES: THE NEW POLITICS OF CORPORATE GREENING (Robert Gibson ed.,
1999) [hereinafter Gibson, VOLUNTARY INITIATIVES]; CARRARO & LtVtQUE,
VOLUNTARY APPROACHES IN ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY, supra note 32.
52 Cf MITCHELL DEAN, GOVERNMENTALITY: POWER AND RULE IN MODERN
SOCIETY, 9, 23-4 (1999). See also tric Darier, Environmental Governmentality:
The Case of Canada's Green Plan, 5 ENVTL POLITICS 585, 585 (1996).
53 DEAN, GOVERNMENTALITY, supra note 53, at 26, 29.
54 Id at 28-29.
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power or division of authority, to ask how we govern and are
governed involves the assertion that, in Mitchell Dean's words,
these divisions and distributions are something to be analysed as
constructed, assembled, contested and transformed from multiple
and heterogeneous elements. The mobile, changing and
contingent assemblages of regimes of government and rule have
analytic precedence over the resultant distributions of power and
divisions between state and civil society and between public and
private spheres."
To give priority to the "how" of government is not simply to describe
how authority operates in a given situation. Rather, it means, as Dean
says, "first of all, to examine all that which is necessary to a particular
regime of practices of government, the conditions of governing in the
broadest sense of that word".56 In principle, this includes an unlimited
and heterogeneous range of things, such as the structures and
interrelations of firms, state agencies and other organizations, the
forms of training and expertise of various professionals, the means for
collecting, recording and analyzing information, and a mass of other
mundane techniques and practices. 57
Second, the point of listing such conditions of governing is not
"merely the description of the empirical routines of government": it
is "an attempt to understand, in addition, how all the above has to be
thought".5" The practices and techniques of government are formed
"in relation to specific forms of knowledge and expertise of a variety
5 Id. at 26.
56 Id. at 28.
57 Id. Dean gives the example of the way in which recipients of
unemployment insurance are governed, the conditions of which might include the
administrative structure and coordination of state and otheragencies, organizations
and businesses; the forms of training and expertise of public servants and other
professionals; means for collecting and managing information about governed
populations; the location and design of various offices and facilities; procedures
and tests used for receiving, interviewing, evaluating and certifying recipients; and
the use of forms, publicity, etc. Id. at 28-29.
58 Id. at 29.
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of authorities"59 such as lawyers, engineers, public health profes-
sionals, environmental scientists and management consultants.
Thought about government also takes the form of various programs
which seek to unify, rationalize and direct these governmental tech-
niques, practices and knowledge in relation to particular diagnoses,
objectives and schemata.6"
Finally, to ask the "how" of government is also to look at the
resultant distributions and locations of power, that is, "to ask what
happens when we govern or are governed". 6' This means, crucially, to
ask about the formation of subjects or agents, "to ask how we are
formed as various types of agents with particular capacities and
possibilities of action".62
The concern of my study is thus not the success or failure of
environmental management systems or EMS standards from the point
of view of criteria such as efficiency, effectiveness, legitimacy,
transparency, accountability, etc. I am not concerned with "whether
and why this or that policy succeeded or failed," as Miller and Rose
put it.63 I am concerned, rather, with identifying the conditions of
environmental government, in particular the mundane techniques and
practices related to environmental management systems, whether
wielded or promoted by the "private" or "public" sector; the
characteristic ways of thinking and speaking about environmental
management, in particular the various bodies of knowledge and
expertise generated around EMSs and EMS standards and on which
they rely, as well as the accompanying programs that seek to unify,
rationalize and direct environmental management; and the effects of
particular techniques and discourses of environmental management,
in particular how particular distributions of power and authority are





63 Peter Miller & Nikolas Rose, Governing Economic Life, 19 ECON. &
Soc'y 1, 4 (1990).
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normalized around particular conceptions of identity, interest and
conduct and how their capacities and possibilities of action are
constituted. To explore these issues involves posing questions of a
sort that has not generally been seen to date in the EMS literature.
The Persistence of Received Conceptual Categories
Related to this tendency to neglect the question of "how" we
govern and are governed in the field of environmental management is
a tendency to assume or reproduce the conventional conceptual
categories upon which understandings of law, politics and government
are typically based. Notwithstanding some attempts to transcend the
categories of "public" and "private," mandatory and voluntary, state
and market, and so on," the EMS literature remains by and large
wedded to these received conceptual dichotomies.
The conceptual dichotomies of public vs. private, state vs.
non-state and mandatory vs. voluntary play prominent parts in the
EMS literature. "Private" and "voluntary" are typically identified as
the defining features of EMS standards.65 First, EMSs and EMS
standards are understood to be a form and emanation of "private"
authority.66 They are seen as "private" in the sense that they involve
actors, forces and institutions that are understood as operating
64 See, e.g. Orts, supra note 2 (adapting Gunther Teubner's theory of
"reflexive law" to the characterization of environmental management systems); and
Errol Meidinger, Environmental Law for Global Civil Society: The Forest
Certification Prototype, unpublished paper presented to a Conference on Social and
Political Dimensions of Forest Certification (2001), available at
http://www.law.buffalo.edu/eemeid (last visited July 29, 2001) (drawing on
theories of legal pluralism and global civil society to characterize environmental
certification systems such as EMS standards as a form of law in their own right).
65 See, e.g., Roht-Arriaza, Private Voluntary Standard-Setting, supra note
44.
66 See, e.g., Roht-Arriaza, Shifting the Point ofRegulation, supra note 2; Roht-
Arriaza, Private Voluntary Standard-Setting, supra note 44; Clapp, supra note 24;
Meidinger, 'Private' Environmental Regulation, supra note 2; Haufler, supra note
35. On the role of "private authority" in international affairs generally, see PRIVATE
AUTHORITY AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS (Claire A. Cutler et al. eds., 1999).
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primarily in modes and spaces distinct from the "public" sphere of
government, law and politics.67 They do not operate primarily through
elected representatives, legislatures, statutes, regulations, state
bureaucracies and courts, but through markets, business firms, trade
associations, consultancies, consumer choices and non-governmental
organizations. Secondly, EMSs and other corporate greening
initiatives are typically defined as "voluntary" and given such labels
as "voluntary codes",68 "voluntary initiatives ' 69 and "voluntary
approaches".7" They are considered "voluntary" in the sense that they
are not dejure required; public authorities do not have to order them
to be undertaken.7' Unlike mandatory governmental regulation,
participation in the development and implementation of these
initiatives is optional, a matter of individual choice rather than official
compulsion. The implications of these "private," "voluntary"
corporate greening initiatives is, of course, the subject of heated
67 See, for example, Webb's definition of "private governance" as "a
continuing process through which conflicting or diverse interests may be accom-
modated and cooperative action may be taken by parties other than the State".
Kernaghan Webb, Introduction to Concepts and Issues, in VOLUNTARY CODES:
PRIVATE GOVERNANCE, THE PUBLIC INTEREST AND INNOVATION 9 (Kernaghan
Webb ed., 2002). Cutler et al. draw a definitional contrast between "private
authority"-which they identify with transnational cooperation among profit-
seeking firms-and the "public" authority of states and formal governmental
structures in international affairs. Cutler et al., supra note 67. Haufler's study of
a "public" role for the "private" sector similarly focuses on self-regulation by the
private sector, which she defines in contrast to regulation by "public authorities".
Haufler, supra note 35, at 8.
68 See, e.g., WEBB, VOLUNTARY CODES, supra note 68.
69 See, e.g., Gibson, VOLUNTARY INITIATIVES, supra note 52.
70 See, e.g., CARRARO & LtVtQUE, VOLUNTARY APPROACHES IN
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY, supra note 32; THE VOLUNTARY APPROACH TO
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY (Arthur Mol et al. eds., 2000).
71 Carlo Carraro & Franqois Ldveque, Introduction: The Rationale and
Potential of Voluntary Approaches, in CARRARO & LV9QUE, VOLUNTARY
APPROACHES IN ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY, supra note 32, 1 [hereinafter Carraro &
Ldveque, The Rationale and Potential of Voluntary Approaches]; Robert Gibson,
Questions About a Gifi Horse, in Gibson, VOLUNTARY INITIATIVES, supra note 52,
3.
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controversy. Some writers herald EMSs as evidence of a revolution in
corporate environmental practices and an example of the promise of
corporate self-regulation,72 some see EMSs as an example of corporate
"greenwash" and a pretense for governments to retreat from environ-
mental regulation,73 while the majority of writers exhibit varying
degrees of skepticism or enthusiasm between these extremes.
Of course these simple dichotomies between private and
public, voluntary and mandatory are often acknowledged to be
problematic in the corporate greening literature. "Private" authority is
understood to have substantial implications for "public" order,
corporate greening initiatives are understood to play a "public" role,
the public-private distinction is acknowledged to be blurry and
shifting, and "voluntary" and legally mandatory systems of regulation
are acknowledged to be highly interdependent.74 Similarly, the
"voluntary" character of EMS standards is frequently problematized."
"Voluntary" initiatives are seldom voluntary in the usual sense. As
one commentator notes, "virtually all such initiatives are undertaken
because the relevant actors have been effectively pressured to act"76
by such factors as cost savings, competitiveness concerns, the threat
of bad publicity, the prospect of governmental regulation and
pressures from customers, suppliers, creditors, insurers, investors,
72 See, e.g., Joseph Cascio, Introduction, in CASCIO, T-iE ISO 14000
HANDBOOK, supra note 2, 1, at 1 [hereinafter Cascio, Introduction] ("the ISO
14000 standards hold out the promise to revolutionize environmental protection as
we have known it in the past quarter century"); Lally, supra note 12.
73 See, e.g., KRUT & GLECKMAN, supra note 13; Saeed Parto, Aiming Low,
in Gibson, VOLUNTARY INITIATIVES, supra note 52, 182.
74 See, e.g., Kernaghan Webb, Voluntary Initiatives and the Law, in Gibson,
VOLUNTARY INITIATIVES, supra note 52, 32 [hereinafter Webb, Voluntary
Initiatives and the Law]; Haufler, supra note 35; Meidinger, Closer Than You May
Think, supra note 44; Kernaghan Webb & Andrew Morrison, The Law and
Voluntary Codes: Examining the "Tangled Web ", in WEBB, VOLUNTARY CODES,
supra note 68, 32.
75 See, e.g., Morrison et al., supra note 12, at 8-10.
76 Robert Gibson, Encouraging Voluntary Initiatives for Corporate Greening:
Consideration for More Systematic Design of Supporting Frameworks at the
National and Global Levels 3 (2002) (unpublished paper on file with author).
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competitors, industry associations, consumers, workers, NGOs, local
communities and others.
Despite these acknowledged limitations of the conventional
categories of political and legal thought, EMSs continue to be
conceived primarily in terms of oppositions between public and
private, mandatory and voluntary, state and market. Even if these
dichotomies are stretched, blurred and questioned no sooner than they
are posited, they still provide the basic framework for identifying and
understanding the phenomenon of corporate greening. Governmental
regulation is the point of departure from which corporate greening is
defined and pursued. The relation of corporate greening to public
authorities and legal systems is an ever present theme.
This tendency to assume a dichotomous distinction between
"private," "voluntary" corporate environmental initiatives and
"public" law and policy prevents a clearer comprehension of the
subtle and complex interpenetration of "public" and "private" actors
and regulatory systems in the field of environmental management
systems. By emphasizing the voluntary and private character of these
initiatives, the debates over EMSs tend not to acknowledge the full
extent of the entanglement of public authorities and voluntary
initiatives." In my view public authorities and legal systems are
deeply involved in the constitution and exercise of "private" authority
to the point that it is not useful to discuss these initiatives in terms of
a public-private divide. While the relationship between EMS initia-
tives and government regulation has received a great deal of attention
in the legal literature, there have been almost no attempts to examine
their interaction systematically or in a manner that questions seriously
77 Cf LIORA SALTER, MANDATED SCIENCE: SCIENCE AND SCIENTISTS IN THE
MAKING OF STANDARDS 31-32 and 178-80 (1988) [hereinafter SALTER, MANDATED
SCIENCE] (arguing that the debate over regulation versus deregulation neglects the
reality of standards, which are neither fully public nor fully private and always
involve some degree of coordination between public and private sectors).
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the conventional metaphor of a public-private divide.78 Distinctions
between public and private, state and non-state, mandatory and
voluntary, etc., are not particularly helpful in understanding the
significance of EMS standards. Rather, EMS standards demonstrate
that the practices of government traverse the categories on which our
understandings of law and politics are typically based. In the
remainder of this article I investigate this issue by exploring the forms
of public authorities' engagements with voluntary EMS standards in
Canada and examining the "governmental" implications of this
experiment in regulation.
Part III: Modes of Engagement between Public Authorities
and Voluntary EMS Initiatives in Canada
A variety of public authorities in Canada have begun to engage
with environmental management systems and voluntary EMS
standards in a range of interesting ways. I use the term "public
authorities" broadly to denote all parts of the Canadian state
apparatus, including government ministers, departments, agencies,
bureaucrats, procurement personnel, regulators, committees, legisla-
tures, prosecutors, courts, administrative tribunals, military facilities,
local governments and public utilities. Their engagements with EMS
initiatives to date have fallen, I suggest, into five rough categories:
steering, self-discipline, knowledge production, reward and command.
I also identify three other categories of engagement which have not
(yet) been employed by Canadian public authorities in relation to
environmental management systems, but can be seen elsewhere:
benchmarking, challenge and borrowing. Together these eight
categories give an indication of the range of Canadian public
authorities' engagements with "private" governance in the field of
78 A notable exception is Meidinger's work on the interaction between the
U.S. legal system and environmental certification systems, including EMS




First, Canadian public authorities have sometimes engaged
with voluntary initiatives such as EMSs and EMS standards in a mode
that can be described as "steering": encouraging voluntary initiatives,
inhibiting them or steering their development, content or use in a
particular direction. At a certain level, all the modes of engagement I
identify could be described in this way. "Steering" might thus be
viewed as an umbrella category covering most public authorities'
interactions with voluntary initiatives. Nonetheless, Canadian public
authorities have exhibited several types of conduct that are distinct
enough from the other categories of engagement to be considered
separately. The primary driver for these engagements is, as Pollution
Probe observes, that "notwithstanding their voluntary nature,
standards are properly regarded by policy makers as an instrument of
governance.IM
Although "steering" often involves active, intentional efforts
to mold conduct, it can also be passive, or even inadvertent. First, it
may include surveillance or intelligence-gathering. Governments
officials may participate in standards development, for instance, as
much to observe and stay abreast of industry developments as to push
standards in any particular direction.8 In this case "steering" consists
79 Two caveats are in order. First, these eight categories of engagement
overlap substantially. A single program or action may involve several modes of
engagement simultaneously. Second, the list of categories is tentative and open-
ended, subject to variation with changing information and the character and
purposes of analysis. Its main purpose is not to set down a definitive typology but
to indicate the extent and variety of interactions among public and private
authorities in the field of environmental management.
SO POLLUTION PROBE, supra note 44 at 41.
SI In Salter's view this is also true of industry participants: intelligence-
gathering about competitors and informal coordination are often more important
to industry participants than the content of particular standards. Liora Salter, The
Housework of Capitalism: Standardization in the Communications and
2002-2003]
162 BUFFALO ENVIRONMENTAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol.10
in patrolling a particular conception of the appropriate boundary
between government and "private" spheres. Second, public authorities
may inadvertently send signals that influence voluntary initiatives. For
instance, governments may, on one hand, publicly encourage firms to
use EMSs and environmental certification initiatives, but on the other,
maintain regulatory frameworks such as forest tenure laws or
environmental audit disclosure rules that inadvertently inhibit such
use.
82
In any event, public authorities in Canada have engaged in
"steering" voluntary EMS initiatives in at least five ways: by
pronouncing official policies on environmental management systems,
formally constituting and funding standardization bodies, participating
in the development of voluntary EMS standards, providing strategic
policy leadership for standardization activities and regulating the
development, content or use of voluntary initiatives.
1. "Talking the Talk": Official Policy Pronouncements
First, some public authorities in Canada and elsewhere have
formulated and pronounced official policies on private sector use of
voluntary EMS initiatives. Such pronouncements, which range from
off-the-cuff remarks to detailed policy statements, can have important
Information Technology Sectors, 23 INT'L J. POL. EcON. 105, 116 (1993-94)
[hereinafter Salter, Housework of Capitalism].
82 A recent report by the B.C. government, for example, found that the
province's forest tenure system, in which government determines forestry planning
requirements, harvest rates and environmental protection standards, made it
difficult for forestry companies to demonstrate the long-term commitment to
sustainable management planning for a defined geographic forest area required for
certification under leading sustainable forestry management programs. BRITISH
COLUMBIA MINISTRY OF FORESTS, IMPLEMENTING FOREST CERTIFICATION IN
BRITISH COLUMBIA: ISSUES AND OPTIONS: REPORT SUMMARY (March 2001), at
http://www.for.gov.bc.ca/het/certification/researchproject.htm.
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legitimation or delegitimation effects for voluntary initiatives.8 3 Their
content varies from enthusiastic (but often vague) endorsement, to
active promotion, to enunciation of conditions or goals for public
authorities' involvement or support, to enumeration of concerns, to
active resistance (although this last is very rare in the case of EMS).
In Canada official pronouncements have tended toward endorsement
and promotion-"talking the talk" of EMS as part of a broader agenda
of regulatory flexibility. Very few Canadian government authorities
have initiated serious consultations or issued careful policy
pronouncements about how, why or in what conditions they will
endorse voluntary EMS initiatives; but this may be changing as some
federal and provincial authorities have begun earnest policy
development efforts regarding EMS. 4
83 Such legitimation effects depend largely on the credibility of official
pronouncements among relevant audiences, with off-hand, vague endorsements
typically having much less effect on the use of voluntary initiatives by industry or
consumers than deliberate pronouncements by well-informed officials who are
capable of distinguishing genuine innovations from mere "business as usual"
advances. See Carraro & L6veque, The Rationale and Potential of Voluntary
Approaches, supra note 72, at 9-10.
84 Some federal government departments (e.g., Environment Canada) and
government officials in several provinces (e.g., Alberta, B.C., Nova Scotia and
Ontario) have expressly encouraged private sector use of EMSs, often in very
general terms in public remarks, web sites or pamphlets. Some have issued
discussion papers or establish modest government-industry partnerships around
EMS implementation, but most of these efforts have been ad hoc and
uncoordinated. More recently, Canadian federal officials participated in the
development of ajoint Canada-Mexico-U.S. policy statement on EMS. See North
American Commission for Environmental Cooperation (NACEC), Improving
Environmental Performance and Compliance: 10 Elements of Effective
Environmental Management Systems (2000), available at http://www.cec.org
(cautiously supporting use of EMSs to achieve public policy goals, endorsing
structure and approach of leading EMS standards such as ISO 14001 and
enunciating ten elements voluntary EMSs should have to satisfy governments'
concerns about environmental performance, pollution prevention, public
accountability and legal compliance). Alberta and Ontario have begun to elaborate
policies on the incorporation of EMS into their regulatory frameworks. See
"Rewards," below. Still, considering that EMSs have been in wide use for more
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2. Constitution and Funding of Standardization Bodies
Second, the federal government is involved in the
establishment and operation of voluntary standards-setting bodies in
Canada. Although not involving overt direction of standardization
activities, this is an interesting but overlooked dimension of inter-
action between governments and voluntary standardization.
Standards-setting bodies in most countries have complicated
relationships to the state apparatus. The Standards Council of Canada,
Canada's principal voluntary standardization organ and its national
ISO member body, is a "quasi-non-governmental organization". 85 It
is a federal crown corporation established by statute in 1970, reporting
to Parliament through Industry Canada and receiving federal
government funding.8 6 Its statutory mandate is to promote efficient
and effective voluntary standardization in Canada by (inter alia)
promoting public-private sector cooperation. 7 Thus its constitutive
instrument emphasizes the hybrid public-private character of
standardization.8"
than a decade, the paucity of considered policy statements is surprising.
85 Leon Gordenker & Thomas G. Weiss, Pluralising Global Governance:
Analytical Approaches and Dimensions, 16 THIRD WORLD Q. 357 (1994); cf
Salter, Housework of Capitalism, supra note 82, at 179.
86 Standards Council of Canada Act, ch. S-16, R.S.C. (1985) (Can.),
amended by ch. I, S.C. 1987 and ch. 24, S.C. 1996 (Can.). The Standards Council
of Canada oversees Canada's National Standards System, an informal federation
of more than 270 independent organizations. It delegates the actual writing of
standards to accredited standards development bodies such as the Canadian
Standards Association (CSA), a private not-for-profit corporation. For an excellent
overview of voluntary standardization in Canada, see CIELAP, supra note 25. Like
the Standards Council of Canada, the majority of ISO national member bodies are
state-owned, but the ISO member bodies in most advanced industrial democracies
other than Canada are private not-for-profit organizations formally independent of
the. state.
87 Standards Council of Canada Act, ch. S-16, § 4(1), R.S.C. (1985) (Can.).
88 Salter's work on health, safety and communication standards provides a
detailed insight into this public-private hybridization inherent in standardization
bodies. See, e.g., SALTER, MANDATED SCIENCE, supra note 78; Salter, Housework
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3. Participation in Standards Development
Third, Canadian government officials have participated
directly in the development of EMS standards in Canada and ISO
since the beginning of EMS standardization in the early 1990s, by
sitting on national standards committees and serving as Canadian
delegates to ISO meetings.8 9 Indeed, government officials participate
in most voluntary standards development in Canada.90 Canadian
standards committees operate on a consensus basis and employ a
"balanced matrix" to ensure that their membership reflects a rough
balance among standards users (industry), service/professional
representatives (including consultants, auditors and registrars),
government officials and "general interest" members (a grab-bag for
consumer, environmental and labor representatives, academics, etc.).9
Government officials often cite the balanced membership and
consensual process of Canadian standards committees and ISO itself
as key reasons to endorse voluntary EMS standards, 9 but the
of Capitalism, supra note 82.
89 Federal government officials have been the most active, a few playing
prominent roles in the development of the ISO 14000 standards. Provincial
officials have also participated on a limited scale, and municipal officials have
begun to participate in Canadian EMS standards committees.
90 In addition to participating in many non-governmental standards
committees, governments have their own standards development organs. For
example, one of the four standards development organizations accredited by the
Standards Council of Canada, the Canadian General Standards Board (CGSB), is
a federal government organization within Public Works and Government Services
Canada. Although CGSB does not develop EMS standards, it provides EMS
auditing and registration services to public and private sector clients.
91 See, e.g., CANADIAN STANDARDS ASSOCIATION, GUIDELINE B:
PROCEDURES FOR ESTABLISHING AND MAINTAINING STANDARDS STEERING
COMMITTEES, (2d ed. 1990), reprinted in CIELAP, supra note 25, Appendix C.
92 See, e.g., COMMISSIONER OF THE ENVIRONMENT AND SUSTAINABLE
DEVELOPMENT, REPORT OF THE COMMISSIONER OF THE ENVIRONMENT AND
SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT 1999 (1999), at http://www.oag-
bvg.gc.ca/domino/reports.nsf/html/c9menu_e.html [hereinafter CESD, 1999
Report].
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impression of balanced consensus may be misleading. Industry and
consultants usually make up a large majority on committees, the
Canadian Standards Association often has difficulty maintaining the
"balanced matrix" on its environmental standards committees 93 and
ISO has been criticized repeatedly for its dominance by big industry
from advanced industrial countries.
4. Strategic Policy Leadership
Fourth, strategic leadership of national and international
standardization activities is seen by many governments as a priority
to ensure international competitiveness of home industry. It was only
in March 2000, however, that the Canadian federal government
launched the Canadian Standards Strategy, to "provide direction and
leadership on how to use standardization to best advance the social
and economic well-being of Canadians in a global economy".94 The
Strategy promotes the use of standards as complements to regulation,
calls for fuller representation of the broadening range of
"standardization stakeholders" and acknowledges that fiscal restraint
and global trade are driving public authorities' increasing reliance on
voluntary standards to achieve public policy goals.95
5. Regulation of Voluntary Initiatives
Finally, public authorities may regulate the development, use
or content of voluntary environmental initiatives. Canadian public
93 See CIELAP, supra note 25.
94 See Standards Council of Canada, Canadian Standards Strategy and
Implementation Proposals (March 2000), at http://www.scc.ca/. The Strategy was
the product of a stakeholder consultation process led by the Standards Council of
Canada and Industry Canada.
95 Id. The Strategy is expressly based on two assumptions: that (1) standards
are becoming a pillar of the new global trade system, and (2) fiscal restraint means
that industry and government are struggling to do more with less and standards can
offer effective, less costly ways to achieve the objectives of reducing costs,
eliminating regulatory burdens and protecting the public interest.
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authorities have generally taken a "hands off" approach to the
development and use of voluntary initiatives,96 including EMSs.
Nonetheless various forms of state regulation may affect the
development and use of EMS initiatives directly or indirectly,
including:97
Competition law, which addresses the possible anti-
competitive effects of competitors coming together to devise
rules for themselves;
Misleading advertising laws, which may apply when a firm
violates the requirements of a voluntary standard to which it
subscribes (e.g., ISO 14001), yet represents itself as
conforming;
International trade law, in particular the Agreement on
Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT Agreement), which requires
member states, including Canada, to do everything reasonable
to ensure that voluntary standards-setting bodies in their
jurisdiction adhere to the Code of Good Practice for the
Preparation, Adoption and Application of Standards, which
essentially applies the TBT Agreement's trade disciplines to
voluntary standardization: i.e., where international standards
exist on a subject, domestic standardization bodies should use
them as the basis for their own standards;98
The presence or absence of clear ground rules for the
development and use of voluntary initiatives, such as
requirements of public participation in the development or
implementation of voluntary initiatives, or public disclosure
96 See, e.g, Webb, Voluntary Initiatives and the Law, supra note 75.
97 See generally id.; John Moffet & Franqois Bregha, Non-Regulatory
Environmental Measures, in Gibson, VOLUNTARY INITIATIVES, supra note 52, 15.
98 See Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (1994), in The Results of
the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations: The Legal Texts, Uruguay
Round (1987-1994), arts. 3.1, 4.1, and Annex 3 [hereinafter TBT Agreement),
available at http://www.wto.org/english/docs e/legal-e/legaie.htm (last visited
Nov. 25, 2002). See also "Self-Discipline," below.
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of information on participants' performance (to date, Canadian
governments have not enacted such rules); and
The presence or absence of a credible "regulatory backstop"
in the form of monitoring and enforcement of existing
environmental laws and demonstrable will to step in with
regulatory instruments should voluntary initiatives fail to
achieve public policy objectives.
Self-Discipline
The second major way Canadian public authorities have
engaged with voluntary EMS initiatives can best be described as self-
discipline.99 It is possible to distinguish two forms of self-discipline:
public authorities "walking the walk" by implementing EMSs in their
own operations; and public authorities ratifying international
agreements that turn voluntary standards into potential constraints on
their authority.
1. "Walking the Walk": Implementing EMSs in Government
Operations
Canadian public authorities at all levels of government have
begun to develop and implement their own EMSs, some on their own
initiative and others as a result of pressure from central government
authorities. At the federal level most major departments and several
agencies now have EMSs, although they vary substantially in scope,
detail and degree of implementation. The federal Auditor General and
the Commissioner of the Environment and Sustainable Development
(CESD) began to encourage federal organizations to implement EMSs
99 This category coincides roughly with Doern et al.'s "regulatory regime
III," the state's regulation of itself. G. Bruce Doern et al., Canadian Regulatory
Institutions: Converging and Colliding Regimes, in CHANGING THE RULES:
CANADIAN REGULATORY REGIMES AND INSTITUTIONS 3 (G. Bruce Doern et al. eds,
1999).
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in the mid- 1990s. Facing mostly desultory responses they soon turned
to prodding and shaming, referring to EMSs as "essential" for
government operations and publicly exposing several departments'
foot-dragging. °° The CESD and Environment Canada play central
roles in assisting federal government bodies to develop and implement
EMSs and appear to consider EMSs mandatory, at least for the 25
major federal departments and agencies that must file Sustainable
Development Strategies.10
Some provincial and territorial ministries have also begun to
implement EMSs and a substantial and growing number of Canadian
municipalities have implemented EMSs either for their entire operations
100 See, e.g., CESD, 1999 Report, supra note 93.
101 Implementation of formal environmental management systems has been
an expectation for departmental sustainable development strategies since they were
first introduced in the mid 1990s. A 1995 federal government guide to greening
government operations declared that federal departments and agencies "are to
develop and implement formal environmental management systems" as part of their
sustainable development strategies. Government of Canada, Directions on
Greening Government Operations (Ottawa: Public Works and Government
Services Canada, 1995), available at http://www.sdinfo.gc.ca/ Sdinfo/ENG/docs
/ggo/default.cfm (last visited December 17,2001); see also Government ofCanada,
A Guide to Green Government (1995), available at http://www.ec.gc.ca
/gmgvt/grngvt e.htm (last visited December 3, 2001). In 1999 the Commissioner
for Environment and Sustainable Development said that he expects to see
"accelerated development" of EMSs in the "second generation" of departmental
sustainable development strategies. COMMISSIONER OF THE ENVIRONMENT AND
SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT, MOVING UP THE LEARNING CURVE: THE SECOND
GENERATION OF SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT STRATEGIES (December 1999)
[hereinafter CESD, MOVING UP THE LEARNING CURVE], available at
http://www.oag-bvg.gc.ca/domino/cesdcedd.nsf/html/c9dece.html (last visited
December 3, 2001). Nonetheless EMSs have not expressly been made legally
mandatory for federal organizations in Canada, as they have in the U.S. where all
federal facilities must implement EMSs by 2005. See Greening the Government
through Leadership in Environmental Management, Exec. Order No. 13148, 65
Fed. Reg. 24593 (April 21, 2000). The new Canadian Environmental Protection
Act authorizes regulations respecting the establishment of environmental
management systems for federal government operations, but none have yet been
promulgated. Canadian Environmental Protection Act 1999, ch. 33, § 209(l)(a),
1999 S.C. (Can.) [hereinafter CEPA 1999).
2002-2003]
170 BUFFALO ENVIRONMENTAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol.10
or for subordinate bodies such as water or waste management units.
Central provincial government authorities have generally done little to
coordinate, encourage, assist or push these developments.
Several interesting issues arise from these self-applications of
EMS to the public sector, including the following. The first issue
concerns public authorities' reasons for implementing their own
EMSs. Although Canadian public authorities list many reasons for
implementing EMSs, one looms large: to set an example for the
private sector.'0 2 In reality, however, the leading edge of EMS design
and implementation is found in forward-thinking corporations,
consulting firms and standardization bodies, along with innovative
public-private consortia outside Canada. 3 Far from leading by
example, many Canadian public authorities are simply scrambling to
keep up with the private sector. 0 4
A second interesting development is the implicit or explicit
endorsement of ISO EMS standards as a model for public sector
EMSs. Most Canadian public authorities' EMSs are modeled on ISO
14004 or (less often) ISO 14001. The federal government has
expressly endorsed ISO 14004 as a guide for public sector EMSs in
numerous policy documents.
102 As Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada expresses it, the federal
government, as the single largest organization in Canada and the largest employer,
purchaser and landlord, can set an excellent example for Canada by implementing
EMSs. Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada, Agriculture in Harmony with Nature
H: AAFC's Sustainable Development Strategy 2001-2004, Publication 2074/E, 43
(2001), available at http://www.agr.ca/policy/environment/eb/
public html/pdfs/sds/SDSIIen.pdf (last visited April 24, 2001).
103 E.g., the Sigma Project in the U.K. (Sustainability-Integrated Guidelines
for Management), at http://www.projectsigma.com (last visited Nov. 25, 2002) and
the Multi-State Working Group on Environmental Management Systems in the
U.S., at http://www.mswg.org (last visited Nov. 25, 2002).
104 See, e.g., CESD, MOVING UP THE LEARNING CURVE, supra note 102;
Auditor General of Canada, Environmental Management Systems: A Principle-
basedApproach, in REPORT OF THE AUDITOR GENERAL OF CANADA TO THE HOUSE
OF COMMONS ch. 11 (October 1995), available at http://www.oag-bvg.gc.ca
/domino/reports.nsf/html951 Ice.html (last visited May 1, 2001) (observing that
federal organizations are far behind the private sector in EMS implementation).
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A third issue concerns verification and oversight of public
sector EMSs. In short, verification of the implementation and
performance of public sector EMSs in Canada is haphazard and
incomplete. Most government organizations disclose very basic
information about their EMSs and some report publicly on their EMS
performance. The Auditor General and CESD monitor the federal
government's implementation of EMSs. There is typically no such
oversight in the provinces. While some Canadian public authorities
have obtained third-party certification for certain individual facilities'
EMSs, most have avoided certification largely because of the taxpayer
expense involved.
Finally, it is worth noting that Canadian public authorities
have implemented EMSs in a wide variety of organizational settings,
from entire government departments to individual branches, agencies,
operating units, facilities or even single buildings. They have been
applied in a range of fields including environmental regulation, food
inspection, transportation, electricity generation, water and waste
management, military supply, forestry operations and other resource
activities.
2. "Lashing to the Mast": Voluntary Standards as Self-Imposed
Constraints on Public Regulatory Authority
Canada is a party to international trade agreements that may
transform voluntary international standards developed by obscure,
often industry-dominated standardization bodies such as ISO into
potential constraints on Canadian governments' freedom to set their
own legal standards for health, safety and the environment. Under the
1994 Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) Agreement, member states
must base their domestic "technical regulations"-i e., environmental
and other regulations governing products or their related processes or
production methods--on existing voluntary standards developed by
international standardization bodies such as ISO unless the standards
would be "an ineffective or inappropriate means for the fulfilment of
the legitimate objectives pursued, for instance because of fundamental
climatic or geographical factors or fundamental technological
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problems."° 5 Under these rules, regulations that are based on existing
international standards are presumed not to create an illegal obstacle
to trade, but regulations that deviate from international standards may
be, and have been, challenged as trade barriers." 6
Although the full measure of these trade disciplines has yet to
be taken, they clearly have potential implications for public
authorities' engagements with voluntary environmental initiatives.
When public authorities begin to promulgate mandatory regulations
on matters covered by voluntary standards, as Nova Scotia and New
Brunswick have done by making ISO 14000-based EMSs mandatory
in the gas pipeline industry,0 7 those standards may become a
discipline on governments' authority to design their own regula-
tions."10 Ironically, therefore, EMS standards, which are almost
universally identified with regulatory flexibility, may ultimately
impose a constraint on such flexibility.
105 TBT Agreement, supra note 99, art. 2.4. Other prominent international
trade agreements to which Canada is a party impose similar disciplines, most
prominently the WTO's Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures Agreement and the
North American Free Trade Agreement. It is not clear whether regulations relating
to EMSs would come within the definition of "technical regulations".
106 Indeed, Canada has been among the most aggressive states in enforcing
these disciplines against its trading partners, for instance successfully challenging
the European Communities' ban on hormone-fed beef as an unjustified deviation
from international food safety standards. See EC-Measures Affecting Meat and
Meat Products (Hormones), Report of the Appellate Body, WTO Doc.
WT/DS26/AB/R, WT/DS48/AB/R (adopted 13 Feb. 1998). More recently,
however, the WTO Appellate Body rejected Canada's challenge to a French ban
on chrysotile asbestos, holding that the ban was a "technical regulation" within the
meaning of the TBT Agreement but holding that it was justified under the public
health exception of Article XX of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. See
EC-Measures Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos-Containing Products, Report of
the Appellate Body, WTO Doc. WT/DSI35/AB/R (12 Mar. 2001). WTO dispute
settlement reports are available online at http://www.wto.org.
107 See "Command," below.
108 See generally DAVID HUNTER ET AL., INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL
LAW AND POLICY 1407 (1998).
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Knowledge Production
The third mode of engagement has as its defining feature the
generation and dissemination of knowledge about voluntary
initiatives. Canadian public authorities have engaged in such knowl-
edge production by conducting or sponsoring research and education
regarding the design, implementation, verification or effects of
environmental management systems.
As for research, numerous federal and provincial government
departments have funded or carried out modest pilot projects, case
studies and surveys of the design, implementation or performance of
EMSs in particular firms or jurisdictions, but none have come close
to the research programs on EMS sponsored by various governments
and public-private consortia in the U.S. and Europe." 9 Canadian
governments have also supported EMS research by sponsoring
research conferences on voluntary initiatives, publishing collections
of research papers and hosting electronic research discussion fora. "°
Turning to education, Canadian public authorities have
propagated knowledge and expertise regarding EMSs through two
principal modalities: training and publicity. Training ranges from
basic primer courses for businesspeople to advanced training for
experts such as EMS auditors. More commonly, Canadian public
authorities have responded to the emergence of voluntary EMS
standards by simply publicizing information about EMSs, typically
109 Probably the most ambitious empirical study of EMS implementation and
performance is the National Database on Environmental Management Systems
project sponsored by the US EPA and conducted by researchers from the
Environmental Law Institute and the University of North Carolina. See supra, note
14.
110 As to the latter, Industry Canada hosts the Voluntary Codes Research
Forum, a leading arena for informal exchange of information about research into
voluntary corporate codes generally with frequent attention to standardization and
EMS-related issues. The Forum consists of a web site and listserv facilitated by Dr.
Kernaghan Webb, Senior Legal Policy Advisor and Chief of Research, Canadian
Office of Consumer Affairs, Industry Canada. The Forum can be found at
http://strategis.ic.gc.ca/SSG/ca00973e.html (last visited Nov. 25, 2002).
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through passive means such as government web sites. Such publicity
is usually aimed at industry but sometimes at consumers as well. It
usually encourages the use of EMSs and conveys information about
EMS standards and the design, implementation, certification, advan-
tages or sector-specific applications of EMSs. It seldom enunciates
public authorities' reservations or concerns; those are typically
addressed in other contexts.11'
These research and educational activities are closely related to
official policy development and pronouncement. 12 Research is a
crucial input in policy development and education, of course, is an
important channel for generating support for preferred policies among
relevant constituencies. Governments often sponsor or conduct
research and education as elements of carefully orchestrated policy
projects and incorporate the fruits of non-state research and creativity
into their own policy making, effectively moving some policy
development costs off government budgets."' In any event these
engagements with voluntary initiatives are usually integrated more or
less into public authorities' broader political agendas, particularly
those springing from platforms of fiscal restraint, government
downsizing, regulatory reinvention, free enterprise and global
competitiveness.
Reward
One of the most prominent themes in discussions of voluntary
initiatives is that voluntary initiatives can be the basis for a new
relationship between regulators and industry emphasizing flexibility,
efficiency, partnership and market incentives rather than the perceived
rigidity and inefficiency of conventional "command and control"
regulation. In this vein, public authorities in various countries,
III See the discussion of official policy pronouncements under "Steering,"
above.
112 Id.
113 See, e.g, Kal Raustiala, The 'Participatory Revolution' in International
Environmental Law, 21 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 537 (1997).
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including Canada, have begun to incorporate voluntary EMS
initiatives into their regulatory strategies by offering concrete rewards
for voluntary EMS implementation. These rewards typically take three
forms: (1) regulatory relief or forbearance (i.e., relaxation of existing
regulatory requirements or forbearance from introducing new ones),
(2)financial incentives and (3) "green procurement" policies.
1. Regulatory Relief and Forbearance
First, governments in several jurisdictions have begun to
establish programs that relax existing regulatory requirements (such
as permitting, reporting, inspections or technology requirements) for
firms that implement EMSs." 4 In 2001 the province of Alberta
became the first Canadian jurisdiction to launch an official program
offering regulatory relief to firms that have EMSs in place." 5 Alberta
Environment's LEAD (Leaders Environmental Approval Document)
program, currently in a pilot phase, requires participating facilities to
implement a very rudimentary EMS," 6 maintain a clean compliance
114 These programs also often provide other kinds of incentives including
subsidies, technical assistance and reputational benefits (e.g. official government
recognition, eligibility for awards and the privilege to display logos or other indicia
of participation). The most prominent examples are probably the U.S. EPA's
National Environmental Performance Track program and the Netherlands'
framework licence system. For information on Performance Track see the official
program web site at http://www.epa.gov/performancetrack (last visited Nov. 25,
2002); on the Dutch framework licences see Netherlands, Ministry of Housing,
Spatial Planning and the Environment, Circular on the Framework Licence andthe
Customised Licence (November 1999) (copy on file with author).
115 See Alberta Environment, LEAD Program Guide-A Guide to Alberta
Environment's Leaders Environmental Approval Document (LEAD) Program:
Pilot Phase (April 2001), available at http://www.gov.ab.ca/env/protenf
/publications/LEADProgramGuideAprO I.pdf (last visited July 17, 2001).
116 In contrast to most EMS-based regulatory relief programs which either
require a mature, third-party certified EMS or an EMS that goes significantly
beyond the requirements of ISO 14001, the LEAD program requires only a loosely
defined "basic" EMS that need not be fully developed, need not have all the
elements of an ISO 14001 EMS and need not be verified by an independent third
2002-2003]
176 BUFFALO ENVIRONMENTAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol.10
record, demonstrate past environmental performance that exceeds
legal requirements, commit to future environmental performance
goals and measures that exceed legal requirements and are based on
continuous improvement and pollution prevention, implement
meaningful public consultation and report annually on performance.
In return, facilities will receive modest regulatory incentives such as
preapproval for minor process and equipment changes, facility-wide
performance targets ("bubbles"), performance- rather than technology-
based requirements and expedited permitting procedures, along with
various forms of public recognition.
The province of Ontario launched its own "Cooperative
Agreements" program in 2002, under which firms that set "beyond
compliance" environmental performance targets for selected priority
pollutants, implement public communication and outreach programs,
report publicly on their environmental performance and obtain
independent third party verification of their performance are offered
modest regulatory incentives." 7 Participating firms must have an EMS
party. Alberta Environment is, however, considering a "tiered" program in which
upper tier participants must have an ISO 14001-equivalent, independently audited
EMS. Id.
"7 See Ontario Ministry of the Environment, A Framework for Ontario's
Cooperative Agreements (Draft, March 2002), available at
http://www.ene.gov.on.ca/envision/envreg/er/documents/2002/PA02EO004fra
mework.pdf (last visited September 25, 2002) [hereinafter Draft Framework].
Background information on the program can be found on Ontario's Environmental
Bill of Rights Registry. See Ontario Ministry of the Environment, Framework for
Ontario's Cooperative Agreements & Pilot Project with the Automotive Parts
Manufacturers'Association, EBR Registry Number PA02EO004 (posted April 2,
2002), available at http://204.40.253.254/envregistry/017397ep.htm (last visited
September 25, 2002). The incentives offered include technical assistance, access
to site-wide pollution approvals, expedited processing of approvals, "single
window" access to the regulatory agency and public recognition. Agreements may
be signed directly with participating facilities or with industry associations. The
first proposed agreement is a five-year pilot project with the Automotive Parts
Manufacturers' Association and a number of its members. Interest in the program
does not appear to be widespread in industry, however, possibly due to the modesty
of the incentives offered, the stringency of the program requirements (which
include, for example, robust public consultation and reporting, as well as
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in place which conforms to "generally accepted EMS standards," is
acceptable to the Ministry of the Environment and embodies the Plan-
Do-Check-Act cycle."' 8 The EMS component of the program is
considerably more demanding than that of the Alberta LEAD
program. Other Canadian governments may be considering such
programs as well." 9 In addition to these general programs, some
Canadian public authorities have experimented on a modest basis with
incorporating EMSs or EMS-related initiatives on an adhoc basis into
government-industry agreements, but it is unclear to what extent such
agreements involve relaxation of existing regulations or forbearance
from introducing new rules. '20
independent third party verification), the fear that adverse publicity and other
sanctions for firms that fail to meet the program's requirements might outweigh the
benefits of participation, and uncertainty about the reliability and predictability of
the provincial government's regulatory and enforcement policies, which have been
in flux for some time. This uncertainty is compounded by the fact that the
Framework expressly reserves the government's right introduce and enforce new
regulatory requirements at any time during the term of a cooperative agreement.
Draft Framework, para. 3.11.
119 Draft Framework, id, Schedule 1. While the Draft Framework does not
endorse or require any particular EMS standard such as ISO 14001, it requires all
the basic elements found in an ISO 14001 EMS, plus some notable extra features,
including an environmental policy that commits to "minimising risks to the
environment, meeting or exceeding regulatory compliance, and continuous
improvement of environmental performance"; a process to identify, document and
assess government-identified priority pollutants; communications and outreach
processes "appropriate to address internal and external stakeholders"; and regular
completion of legal compliance audits. Id
119 It is possible, for instance, that Environment Canada could couple EMSs
with regulatory incentives in pollution prevention plans authorized under the new
Canadian Environmental Protection Act CEPA 1999, supra note 102, § 56.
120 See, e.g., Ontario Ministry of the Environment, Environmental
Partnerships Branch, Progress Report 2001: Ontario Initiatives in Pollution
Prevention (2001), available at http://www.ene.gov.on.ca
/envision/techdocs/3 5510 1 e.pdf, Draft Memorandum of Understanding Between
the Governments of Canada, Ontario and Alberta and the Canadian Chemical
Producers' Association on Environmental Protection Through Action Under CCPA
Responsible Care®, at http://www.ec.gc.ca/nopp/chemical/ccpa/indexe.htm (last
visited October 30, 2001).
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In addition, firms that have EMSs may be rewarded with
leniency in enforcement after a regulatory violation is discovered.
Environmental enforcement policies in some jurisdictions extend
some leniency in the exercise of enforcement discretion to firms with
EMSs. Not so in Canada: although many environmental policy-
makers and permitting authorities in Canada encourage firms to
implement EMSs, Canadian environmental enforcement policies
appear to give little or no weight to voluntary EMSs. 2' Upon
conviction, courts may consider implementation of a voluntary EMS
as a mitigating factor in sentencing for environmental regulatory
offences, although I am unaware of any instances of this happening.'22
2. Financial Incentives
While numerous foreign governments have offered grants, tax
credits, preferential access to government loans and other financial
incentives for private sector EMS implementation or certification, to
date Canadian public authorities have not made much use of these
tools. "
121 Environment Canada's new Compliance and Enforcement Policy, for
instance, makes no mention of EMSs at all, although it does recognize the "power
and effectiveness of environmental audits as a management tool" and encourages
their use. Environment Canada, Compliance and Enforcement Policy for the
Canadian Environmental Protection Act, 1999 (Ottawa: Environment Canada,
2001), available at Environment Canada homepage, http://www.ec.gc.ca
/enforce/homepage/cepa/CEPA99_final_eng.pdf.pdf (last visited July 4, 2001).
122 For example, the new Canadian Environmental Protection Act is the first
legislation in Canada to expressly authorize a sentencing court to take the presence
of an EMS into account as a mitigating factor in sentencing. CEPA 1999, supra
note 102, § 287(c).
123 Between 1994 and 2000 the province of Nova Scotia offered a corporate
income tax credit to assist Nova Scotia companies with costs of achieving ISO
9000 or 14001 certification. The credit was 25% of eligible expenditures, which
included audits, registrar fees, training and documentation. It appears that few
companies claimed this tax credit for ISO 14001 certification expenses, however,
possibly because the provincial government failed adequately to bring it to
industry's attention.
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3. Green Government Procurement
Governments are among the largest purchasers of goods and
services in a jurisdiction and their purchasing policies can have a
substantial impact on business. Many governments, including the
Canadian federal government, have encouraged suppliers to
implement EMSs or obtain third-party certification of their EMSs, but
only a handful, none of which are Canadian, have made this a formal
purchasing preference or requirement. 24 Although green procurement
policies may reward firms that adhere to voluntary initiatives, they can
also have a coercive aspect: EMSs may ultimately be transformed into
a defacto requirement for doing business if enough public and private
sector buyers make EMS implementation or certification a purchasing
requirement. 25
124 No Canadian government appears to have made EMSs a formal
procurement consideration or requirement, although the federal government
encourages government buyers to purchase from firms that are ISO 14001 certified.
Public Works and Government Services Canada, ISO 14001-A New Tool for
Buying Green, at http://contractscanada.gc.ca/sl/en/iso I 4-e.htm (last visited March
20, 2001). Some government entities in Japan and Switzerland reportedly give
formal preference to suppliers with EMSs. Laura E. Ber6n, "ISO 14000 and Trade
Implications: Facts and Trends," paper presented at Seminar on Trade,
Environment and the ISO 14000 Series, Ninth Annual Meeting of ISO/TC 207,
Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia (Jul. 4, 2001) (copy on file with author). The US EPA is
considering preferential government procurement treatment of products
manufactured at facilities participating in the Performance Track program. US
EPA, Summary ofEPA's Performance Track Proposal (9 March 2000) (copy on
file with author). The US Departments of Defense and Energy reportedly require
first- and second-level suppliers to be ISO 14001 certified. Stenzel, supra note 21,
at 270. See generally, Laurent Hourcle & Frederick J. Lees, Applicability oflSO
14000 Standards to Government Contracts, 27 ENVTL. L. REP. 10071 (1997).
125 Although this situation is still a long way off, the trend toward requiring
EMSs can be expected to continue in private sector procurement (see supra note
6 and accompanying text) and spread to public sector purchasing as well.
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Command
Both industry and government usually resist proposals to make
voluntary initiatives mandatory. It is very uncommon for public
authorities to issue legally binding commands requiring firms to
implement EMSs or demonstrate their conformance to an EMS
standard. On the rare occasions this has happened in Canada it has
been with the affected firms' or industry's support, either because they
found the alternatives even worse, they were planning to implement
or obtain certification of an EMS anyway or they stood to benefit
directly from the arrangement.
First, in a handful of cases Canadianjudges have used creative
sentencing powers 26 to order an environmental offender to implement
an ISO 14001-based EMS or obtain ISO 14001 certification.'27 In
126 E.g., Environmental Protection and Enhancement Act, ch. E-13.3, §
220(1), 1992 S.A. (Alta.); Environmental Protection Act, R.S.O., ch. E. 19, § 190
(1990) (Ont.). The Canadian Environmental Protection Act expressly authorizes
a sentencing court to direct an offender to "implement an environmental
management system that meets a recognized Canadian or international standard,"
but no orders appear to have been made under this new provision. CEPA 1999,
supra note 102, § 291(l). Although Ontario pioneered creative sentencing in
Canada, the provincial Progressive Conservative government has reportedly
ordered provincial prosecutors not to use it. Saxe, supra note 16, at 29. Two pillars
of neoliberal politics appear to be in tension here: on one hand, an agenda of
flexible regulation in which voluntary initiatives are encouraged and proposed
government regulations are subject to cost-benefit analysis; and on the other hand,
a "tough on crime" agenda of"zero tolerance" and stiff penalties that seldom seems
to be subjected to the same cost-benefit disciplines.
127 Regina v. Prospec Chemicals Ltd., 19 Can. Envtl. L. Rep. (New Series)
178 (Alta. Prov. Ct. 1996) (ordering chemical company which was already a
member of chemical industry's voluntary Responsible Care program to implement
third-party certified ISO 14001 EMS); Regina v. Van Waters & Rogers Ltd., 220
A.R. 315 (Alta. Prov. Ct. 1998) (ordering chemical company to undergo
independent environmental compliance and ISO 14001 EMS audits, upgrade its
EMS manual and operational controls, establish procedures for ongoing evaluation
of conformance to ISO 14001 and present an EMS workshop to industry peers, but
not ordering ISO 14001 certification); Regina v. Calgary (City), 272 A.R. 161
(Alta. Prov. Ct. 2000) (ordering city to obtain ISO 14001 certification for two of
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every case the defendant either proposed or agreed to the order, often
because it was considering implementing or certifying an EMS
anyway and could expect lower fines and fewer charges in exchange.
Prosecutors and judges support such orders because they believe ISO
certification will enhance future compliance; moreover it is easy to
verify and is obtained at the defendant's expense. 128
Second, the provinces of Nova Scotia and New Brunswick
were among the first jurisdictions in the world to make EMS
implementation mandatory for all firms in a particular industry
sector. 12 Both provinces have enacted regulations requiring gas
pipeline operators to implement ISO 14000-based EMSs. 3 0 This was
its water treatment plants by 2003 and declaring that an ISO 14001 EMS was "far
in excess of what the present law and regulations require of a municipality"). Saxe
discusses these cases and also mentions a fourth unreported decision, Regina v.
Prototype Circuits Inc. (ordering circuit board manufacturer to establish an EMS
leading to ISO 14000 certification). Saxe, supra note 16. Finally, in another case
the court ordered the federal government to fund a tribal council's development of
an EMS: Regina v. Canada (Minister of Indian Affairs), [2000] O.J. No. 5076
(Quicklaw) (Ont. Sup. Ct. Justice 2000) (ordering Department of Indian Affairs to
pay $200,000 to support tribal council's development of a pollution prevention and
environmental management system program for fuel storage tanks). [Note: in
Canadian prosecutions, Regina refers to the Queen, Canada's nominal head of
state, as represented by the Crown Prosecutor, not to the city of Regina,
Saskatchewan.]
128 Saxe, supra note 16, at 26.
129 Governments in Brazil, the Caribbean, Zimbabwe and elsewhere have
reportedly considered or enacted legislation requiring all firms in sectors such as
forestry or cruise shipping to implement EMSs, and some developing countries
have reportedly considered requiring all firms to implement EMSs as an easy fix
for inadequate or under-enforced environmental regulation. See, e.g., Meidinger,
Closer Than You May Think, supra note 44 at 10166; Saxe, supra note 16, at 30;
Stenzel, supra note 21, at 276. The European Union has twice considered the idea
of making its own voluntary EMS initiative, the Eco-Management and Audit
Scheme (EMAS), mandatory: first when the scheme was developed in the early
1990s and later when it was reviewed and revised between 1998 and 2001. Both
times the relevant EU organs rejected the idea.
130 See Pipeline Regulations, N.S. Reg. 66/98, § 19(1) (N.S.) (requiring
pipeline companies to establish an EMS to the ISO 14000 standard or equivalent);
Gas Pipeline Regulation, N.B. Reg. 99-61, § 46 (N.B.) (requiring all gas
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part of a move toward greater self-regulation in the sector. The
governments supported mandatory ISO 14000 implementation as a
credible external benchmark that would make self-regulation
acceptable, while industry positively preferred ISO 14000 to govern-
ment regulation. 3'
Finally, Alberta's LEAD program will make implementation
and maintenance of an EMS a licence term and specify the minimum
elements of the EMS in the licence itself. This appears to be the first
instance in Canada in which regulators will require EMS
implementation or certification as a term of an operating permit or
administrative order'. 32
Industry's willingness to have these EMS standards turned into
binding legal requirements may also reflect the special role that
voluntary standards developed by formal standardization bodies such
as CSA and ISO play in government regulation. Governments have a
long tradition of incorporating voluntary technical standards (e.g., for
building materials, construction, plumbing, fire safety, engineering,
food safety, medical devices and so on) into mandatory regulations.133
distributors to develop and implement an EMS) and Gas Distribution and
Marketers' Filing Regulation, N.B. Reg. 99-60, § 7(12) (N.B.) (requiring all gas
distributors applying for a permit for a gas pipeline that will affect a "sensitive
feature" to develop an EMS that meets the requirements of ISO 14000 or a similar
standard). Neither province requires companies to have their EMSs certified by a
third party.
131 Saxe, supra note 16, at 38.
132 See Alberta Environment, LEAD Program Guide, supra note 52 at 7 and
Appendix B. In addition, at least one licensing authority has expressly relied on a
regulated entity's plans to obtain ISO 14001 certification as a basis for issuing an
environmental approval. Re Material Resource Recovery SRBP Inc., No. EP-97-04
(Ont. Envtl. Assessment Bd. Jan. 21, 1998) (approving hazardous waste facility
partly in reliance on applicant's plan to apply for ISO 14001 certification). The
decision is discussed in Saxe, supra note 16, at 30.
133 See SALTER, MANDATED SCIENCE, supra note 78, at 25. The CSA
estimates that approximately one-third of its standards have been referred to in
provincial and federal laws. CSA, "Association activities," in ISO 14001:1996,
supra note 3 (back matter). Saxe reports that the term "CSA" is mentioned 233
times in Ontario statutes and regulations alone, 170 of these mentions being in
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In addition to these "public law" methods, the terms of a
voluntary EMS initiative may be made mandatory through private
litigation. A firm may agree to adhere to an EMS standard or other
voluntary initiative in an agreement with regulators, a commercial
supply contract or trade association membership agreement. 3 4 Such
a voluntary undertaking may be converted into a legally binding
command when a party to the agreement seeks judicial enforcement
of the agreement.3'" Some commentators believe that these private law
enforcement tools hold the key to successful regulation of corporate
behavior through voluntary codes.'36
building code regulations. Saxe, supra note 16, at 37. See also Robert W.
Hamilton, The Role of Nongovernmental Standards in the Development of
Mandatory Federal Standards Affecting Safety or Health, 56 TEX. L. REv. 1329
(1978) (examining the use of voluntary standards in the development of U.S. health
and safety regulations).
134 For example, the Canadian Electrical Association has announced that all
its members must have an ISO 14001 or equivalent EMS in place by a certain date;
the U.S.-based International Council of Cruise Lines recently announced that it will
make EMS implementation a mandatory membership condition, in an effort to
preempt tougher government regulation and reduce adverse attention to chronic
marine pollution; the Canadian Chemical Producers' Association requires its
members to implement the Responsible Care program; and numerous other industry
associations in Canada and around the world require their members either to
subscribe or verifiably demonstrate conformance to various environmental
principles or codes of conduct. Courts have held that industry associations may use
contract-based actions to discipline members for failure to meet agreed-upon
voluntary standards. Webb, Voluntary Initiatives and the Law, supra note 75 at 38.
Adherence to voluntary initiatives could also be made a term of insurance or
finance contracts, although I know of no such contracts involving EMS.
135 Webb, Voluntary Initiatives and the Law, supra note 75; Meidinger,
Closer Than You May Think, supra note 44.
136 See, e.g., Webb, Voluntary Initiatives and the Law, supra note 75, at 38-
39; Dr. Webb has also made this argument in postings to the Voluntary Codes
Research Forum listserv (see supra note 47). In addition to contract law, voluntary
initiatives may also be enforced through property or trust law in certain
circumstances. See Meidinger, Closer Than You May Think, supra note 44.
2002-2003]
184 BUFFALO ENVIRONMENTAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol.10
Benchmarking
Canadian courts often use widely accepted voluntary standards
and other evidence of industry custom as benchmarks'7 for determining
whether a defendant exercised "reasonable care" in a tort case' or "due
diligence" to avoid committing a regulatory offence.'39 Several com-
mentators and government officials have suggested that implementation
of an ISO EMS constitutes "due diligence"."4 ° Although no Canadian
137 The term "benchmarking" is often used to describe a technique used by
organizations to study "best practices" in other organizations or industries in order
to assess and improve their own practices. I do not use the term in that sense but
in the sense of a third party adjudicator judging an organization's performance
against a chosen external standard.
138 See, e.g., Webb, Voluntary Initiatives and the Law, supra note 75;
Meidinger, Closer Than You May Think, supra note 44; Saxe, supra note 16.
Voluntary initiatives may be used to determine the standard for "reasonable use"
of land in a nuisance action or, more commonly, "reasonable care" in a negligence
action. See, e.g., Visp Constr. v. Scepter Mfg., 45 Constr. L. Rep. 170 (Ont. Ct.,
Gen. Div. 1991) (defendant in product liability action not negligent because its
manufacturing process conformed to voluntary CSA standard, CSA standard was
reasonable notwithstanding that CSA was made up largely of manufacturers'
representatives and that higher standards allegedly existed, and defendant took
reasonable care to assure its product met the CSA standard particularly by
maintaining CSA certification of its products and manufacturing process).
139 In Canada, a defendant will not be found guilty of a "strict liability"
offence, which includes most environmental regulatory offences, if the person
establishes that he or she exercised "due diligence," i.e. did everything reasonable
in the circumstances to avoid committing the offence. See Regina v. Sault Ste.
Marie, [1978] 2 S.C.R. 1299, 85 D.L.R. (3d) 161, 40 C.C.C. (2d) 353 (Can. Sup.
Ct. 1978); Elaine L. Hughes, The Reasonable Care Defences, 2 J. ENVTL. L. &
PRAC. 214 (1992). Due diligence is essentially equivalent to the civil negligence
standard. In both civil and regulatory cases, conformance to industry custom is
usually strong evidence of reasonableness unless the custom itself is unreasonable
or the defendant's particular circumstances require more.
140 See, e.g. Saxe, supra note 16, at 21; Taylor, Environmental Regulation,
supra note 47, at 20; Taylor, Standardization in Tune, supra note 15, at 530-531;
CESD, 1999 Report, supra note 93, at § 1.45 (declaring ISO 14001 to be the
standard of due diligence). In fact, demonstrating "due diligence" and thereby
avoiding regulatory liability appears to be one of the leading motivations for public
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court has yet used voluntary EMS standards as a benchmark for
liability, the prospect seems increasingly likely. Moreover, the prospect
deserves critical attention because, first, it is doubtful that an ISO 14001
EMS satisfies the requirements of reasonable care or "due diligence".
While it enables an organization to implement systematically its own
environmental goals and prevent unplanned pollution incidents, it does
not require the organization to achieve any particular level of
environmental performance or legal compliance. Its focus is on ensuring
conformance to the standard rather than putting in place a system to
prevent the commission of regulatory offences or otherwise avoiding
breaching legal duties of care. 4'
Second, the use of EMS standards as benchmarks for liability
may give voluntary industry-developed initiatives a power they could
not achieve on their own, by effectively imposing the terms of such
initiatives on organizations that neither used the initiative nor
participated in its development.' Finally, the prospect of such
judicial benchmarking may place other state actors in a dilemma, as
Webb points out: if government officials fail to participate in the
development of voluntary initiatives "there is a risk that the standards
produced will be considered reasonable by judges ... even though they
may be viewed as inadequate by government"; but if government
sector organizations to implement EMSs, as Canadian public authorities face more
frequent environmental prosecutions and increasingly severe penalties if convicted.
141 In Canada, "due diligence" requires the establishment of"a proper system
to prevent commission of the offence." Regina v. Bata Industries Ltd., 9 O.R. (3d)
329 at 339 (Ont. Prov. Ct. 1992). Such a system should include several elements:
(1) the firm's directors should establish a "pollution prevention system," including
supervision and inspection, improvement of business methods and exhortation of
employees; (2) the directors should ensure that corporate officers have been
instructed to set up a system "sufficient within the terms and practices of its
industry of ensuring compliance with environmental laws" and to report to the
board periodically on the operation of the system and promptly on any substantial
non-compliance; (3) the directors should ensure that the officers address promptly
any environmental concerns brought to their attention by regulators or other
interested parties; (4) the directors should immediately and personally react when
they notice the system has failed. Id at 362-363.
142 Webb, Voluntary Initiatives and the Law, supra note 75, at 32, 40.
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officials do participate in the development of voluntary initiatives in
an effort to influence their content, it may be difficult for prosecutors
to argue later that the initiative does not constitute "due diligence"
even though the government's views may not have been reflected in
the initiative as adopted.'43
Challenge
Another mode of engagement with voluntary initiatives that
has been pursued by some public authorities in the environmental
arena is to challenge firms to pledge to implement voluntary
environmental measures and report their results publicly. This is often
used as an alternative to introducing new regulatory measures. In
Canada, it has been used to address such issues as greenhouse gas
emissions and releases of toxic substances, but no government has yet
developed a challenge program involving industry adoption of EMSs.
Borrowing
Finally, public authorities can incorporate voluntary initiatives
developed by non-governmental bodies into legal instruments without
making their observance mandatory. For instance, statutes, regula-
tions, operating permits or agreements with regulated entities might
specify a voluntary standard as a default basis for issuing approvals;
make exceedance of a voluntary standard the trigger for
documentation, reporting or remediation duties; adopt a voluntary
standard's definition of a term; or authorize the use of a voluntary
standard for testing, inspecting or measuring a regulated entity's
operations, equipment, or products. Although this has not been done
with EMS standards in Canada, one could imagine regulations, for
example, authorizing the use of ISO environmental auditing standards
or specifying ISO 14001 certification as a basis for "deemed"
approval of particular kinds of activities.
13 Id. at 35-36.
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Part IV: Beyond the Public-Private Divide: Toward an
Alternative Conception of Government
Rethinking "Government"
Most of these interactions among public authorities and
voluntary non-state initiatives occur in a quiet comer of environmental
politics populated mainly by technical experts-indeed in a space that
many participants do not perceive as political. Nonetheless the
participants are involved, wittingly or unwittingly, in the definition
and redefinition of the scope and concerns of politics and law in the
field of the environment. It would not be accurate to view these
developments as evidence of a "relentless augmentation of the powers
of a centralizing, controlling and regulating state" that has
increasingly colonized the "lifeworld". ' Nor, on the other hand, does
the evidence reveal a takeover of public policy making by industry.
Rather, what emerges is a range of heterogeneous, shifting links
among a variety of public and private authorities, through which these
authorities pursue their goals not so much by domination and control
as by exercising subtle and unpredictable influences upon the
interests, beliefs and choices of firms and individuals. These links rely
upon a range of experts and associated bodies of knowledge perceived
to be relatively autonomous from both politics and the market (e.g.,
accounting, engineering, standardization and law); and they involve
alliances and tensions not just between public and private authorities,
but among a multiplicity of public authorities themselves (e.g.,
government ministers, environmental commissioners, legislators,
regulators, inspectors, prosecutors, judges and government purchasing
personnel).
This hybridization of law and market, state and non-state
suggests the need for an alternative characterization of "government"
that moves beyond the metaphor of a public-private divide to
encompass the entire complex of ideals, goals, rationales, techniques,
144 NIKOLAs ROSE, POWERS OF FREEDOM: REFRAMINO POLITICAL THOUGHT
18(1999).
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procedures and programs by which a diversity of state and non-state
authorities seek to shape human conduct to desired ends. This
alternative conception of government prompts us, first, to examine
law and politics at the level of the mundane techniques by which
various authorities seek to effectuate their governmental ambitions.
Viewed this way, EMSs and EMS standards instantiate a broader
tendency in contemporary practices of government in the advanced
industrial democracies to "depoliticize" certain issues and problems
by positioning them either as technical matters to be resolved by the
application of neutral expertise or as private matters to be resolved by
market forces. The EMS example also signals a shift in political
rationales, a redrawing of the appropriate aims and forms of "gover-
nance," the boundaries of politics, law and market and the distribution
of tasks between different authorities. Finally, it is possible to make
some tentative suggestions as to the role law might play in facilitating
or resisting these transformations (see Section VI).
The problem with employing the metaphor of a public-private
divide to analyze contemporary practices of ordering and directing
social relations, as Rose and Miller point out, is that
the political vocabulary structured by oppositions between state
and civil society, public and private, government and market,
coercion and consent, sovereignty and autonomy and the like,
does not adequately characterise the diverse ways in which rule
is exercised in advanced liberal democracies. 45
What is needed is an alternative way of thinking about
government that avoids the limitations of these dichotomies. There is
nothing new in this suggestion, of course. Rather, this is a lesson that
we, as lawyers, seem to be constantly repeating. These dichotomies
have been questioned repeatedly by successive waves of criticism in
legal studies, from legal realism to feminist legal theory to critical
145 Nikolas Rose & Peter Miller, Political Power Beyond the State:
Problematics of Government, 43 BRIT. J. SOCIOLOGY 173, 174 (1992) [hereinafter
Rose & Miller, Political Power Beyond the State].
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legal studies to legal pluralism. Exploding, fragmenting or
contextualizing the state, law, sovereignty, public, private and so on,
have been regular features of criticism and innovation in the social
sciences and law throughout the last century, so that proclaiming the
"death of the state" (or law or sovereignty) has become part of the
ritual of renewal in discipline after discipline.'46 To paraphrase
Foucault, scholars have repeatedly attempted to sever the "king's
head" in social and legal thought, yet the next generation of critics
always seems to find it back on the sovereign's shoulders.'47
That these conventional categories remain central to theories
and practices of government after all this critical attention is a puzzle
in itself. As I suggested in Part II, we might gain analytical leverage
over this puzzle if we focus on the problematics of government-the
questions of "how we govern and are govemed"--instead of over-
valuing the problem of the state.' The example of environmental
management systems and standards demonstrates that the regulation
of environment-economy interactions is accomplished by an array of
public and private authorities and institutions including standardi-
zation bodies, EMS auditors and certifiers, consultants, corporate
managers, customers, regulatory agencies, legislatures, government
inspectors, courts and (to a lesser extent) labor unions, consumers and
public interest NGOs. It is the practices and projects of this array of
state and non-state authorities that "make possible the continual
definition and redefinition of what is within the competence of the
state and what is not, the public versus the private, and so on".'49 In
146 Cf David Kennedy, Thinking Against the Box: When Renewal Repeats,
32 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 335 (2000) (describing similar dynamics of
intellectual renewal in the field of international law).
147 See MICHEL FOUCAULT, I THE HISTORY OF SEXUALITY: INTRODUCTION
88-89 (1976) (remarking that two centuries after the political revolutions that
overthrew the absolutist monarchies of Europe, in the field of political thought we
have not yet cut off the king's head).
148 Rose & Miller, Political Power Beyond the State, supra note 146, at 174-
175.
149 Michel Foucault, Governmentality, in THE FOUCAULT EFFECT 87, 103
(Graham Burchell et al. eds., 1991) [hereinafter Foucault, Governmentality].
2002-2003]
190 BUFFALO ENVIRONMENTAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 10
this context the familiar feminist claim that "the personal is political,"
modified to read "the private is public", may be more appropriate than
the metaphor of a public-private divide to characterize the implica-
tions of voluntary EMS standards.
Disrupting the public-private dichotomy does not mean
denying its continuing relevance, however. Rather, it calls for a
broader conception of government that enables us to uncover and
examine the ways in which conventional divisions between state,
society, law, market, public and private are used to position certain
concerns within and others outside the domains of politics, law or the
state. This uncovering may in turn allow us to reclaim excluded
concerns for contestation or examine how such exclusion or inclusion
tracks or reproduces social relations of power and inequality.
In this broader conception, "government" can be understood
as the entire collection of goals, rationales, plans, procedures and
programs by which a diversity of state and non-state authorities seek
more or less systematically to shape the conduct of individuals,
organizations (including firms) and populations to desired ends. 5°
Michel Foucault coined the term "governmentality" to describe the
techniques and justifications by which government in this sense is
effectuated."' Governmentality can be analyzed in terms of political
rationalities and governmental technologies. Political rationalities are
"the changing discursive fields within which the exercise of power is
conceptualised, the moral justifications for particular ways of
exercising power by diverse authorities, notions of the appropriate
forms, objects and limits of politics, and conceptions of the proper
distribution of such tasks among secular, spiritual, military and
150 In this conception, government includes the government of the state, the
government of others and the government of oneself. See generally Foucault,
Governmentality, supra note 150; Burchell, Gordon and Miller, supra note 83;
Rose & Miller, Political Power Beyond the State, supra note 146; ROSE, supra
note 145; DEAN, supra note 53; Paul Rutherford, The Entry of Life into History, in
DISCOURSES OF THE ENVIRONMENT 37 (tric Darier ed., 1999).
151 Foucault, Governmentality, supra note 150.
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familial sectors."'1 2 Governmental technologies are "the complex of
mundane programmes, calculations, techniques, apparatuses, docu-
ments and procedures through which authorities seek to embody and
give effect to governmental ambitions".'
Expertise plays a key role in governmentality. In the field of
environmental management, expertise in the form of the specialized
knowledges and vocabularies of environmental management
consultants, standardization experts, auditors and certifiers, provides
a link between the governmental objectives of public and private
authorities and the minutiae of daily life in factories, offices, markets
and homes. Making this link is crucial because neither complete
knowledge nor total control of the conduct of individuals, groups,
firms or populations is possible. Modem forms of government rely
heavily on "action at a distance," recognizing a reserved domain for
individual, autonomous action and molding the conception and
exercise of this capacity for action without destroying its autonomy. '54
Expertise makes it possible to "reconcile the principle that the domain
of the political must be restricted with the recognition of the vital
political implications of formally private activities.""' Experts forge
a link between authorities and subjects of rule, while preserving the
autonomy of a "private" sphere, by translating the governmental
concerns of authorities and the daily worries of individuals and groups
into specialized technical vocabularies that claim the power of truth
and objectivity and offer techniques to manage better, live healthier
and align individual choices with governmental ends.'56
152 Rose & Miller, Political Power Beyondthe State, supra note 146, at 175.
153 Id.
54 This idea of "action at a distance" has been used quite effectively by some
proponents of "regulatory reinvention". See, e.g., GUNNINGHAM & GRABOSKY,
supra note 44, at 10, 123-125; Peter N. Grabosky, Using Non-Governmental
Resources to Foster Regulatory Compliance, 8 GOVERNANCE 527 (1995).
1ss Rose & Miller, Political Power Beyond the State, supra note 146, at 187.
156 The influential and problematic role of expertise has been recognized in
numerous other contexts, including the literature on epistemic communities (see,
e.g., PETER M. HAAS, SAVING THE MEDITERRANEAN (1990); Special Issue:
Knowledge, Power, and International Policy Coordination, 46 INTERNATIONAL
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Some sociolegal scholars have examined law from a
governmentality perspective, 5 7 and more recently a small number of
environmental studies scholars have begun to apply govemmentality
analysis to environmental politics.'58 In the remainder of this section
of the article I explore what it might mean to apply governmentality
analysis to the interface between environmental law and corporate
EMS initiatives. As will become clear, my principal argument is that
the choice of EMSs as a technique of environmental government,
along with its accompanying political rationalities, tend to deflect or
deactivate the substantial political stakes of corporate environmental
management. It is important to point out at the outset that I do not
believe this effect is limited to those cases where private sector firms
develop or implement EMSs and EMS standards "on their own,"
largely without the involvement of public authorities. It can also be
seen in public authorities' engagements in the development,
promotion or implementation of EMS initiatives. In other words, my
argument is that these features are characteristic of EMSs generally,
whether integrated into public authorities' regulatory and other
programs or deployed by the private sector.
Environmental Management Systems as Governmental
Technologies
Environmental management systems and EMS standardization
can be viewed as technologies for governing human-environment
ORGANIZATION 1 (1992)); and the policy networks literature (see, e.g., POLICY
NETWORKS: EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE AND THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS (Bernd
Marin & Renate Mayntz eds., 1991); Michael M. Atkinson & William D. Coleman,
Policy Networks, Policy Communities and the Problems of Governance, 5
GOVERNANCE 158 (1992)).
157 See, e.g., Nikolas Rose & Mariana Valverde, Governed By Law?, 7 SOC.
& LEG. STUD. 541(1998); ALAN HUNT & GARY WICKHAM, FOUCAULT AND LAW:
TOWARDS A SOCIOLOGY OF LAW AS GOVERNANCE (1994); ALAN HUNT,
EXPLORATIONS IN LAW AND SOCIETY: TOWARD A CONSTITUTIVE THEORY OF LAW
(1993).
158 See, e.g., Darier, Environmental Governmentality, supra note 53.
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interactions. They are collections of standard procedures, routines,
techniques and documents through which the aspiration to manage the
environmental impacts of organizations' activities, products and
services is rendered operable. It is through these sorts of detailed,
repetitive, mundane mechanisms-such as identifying and assessing
the significance of the environmental impacts of an organization's
activities, setting environmental objectives and targets, developing
and applying environmental performance indicators, assigning organi-
zational roles and responsibilities, establishing and documenting
operational procedures and controls, training employees, measuring
and monitoring the organization's performance, testing and calibrating
measurement equipment, calculating, computing and analyzing data,
maintaining and managing records, and auditing and reviewing the
management system-that the governmental ambitions and schemes
of public and private authorities are instantiated.
What is revealed by viewing voluntary EMS initiatives in this
light? EMSs treat the problem of environmental degradation as a
question of managerial technique, to be resolved by the application of
neutral technical expertise in light of the judgments of commercial
actors in the marketplace. Conflicts about public health, environ-
mental quality, competitiveness, corporate accountability and domi-
nance among competing firms or trading blocs are acted out as if they
were merely technical matters.'59 The result, as we shall see, is the
depoliticization of a set of important environmental, public health and
economic issues.
While public authorities play a part in the development,
standardization and implementation of EMSs, these processes are
driven by industry. Within the EMS standardization community and
among most public authorities this is generally acknowledged as
appropriate: industry is the primary user of the standards and should
play the major role in developing and implementing them. 6 ' EMS
standards are primarily understood as a form of corporate self-
159 Cf Salter, Housework of Capitalism, supra note 82, at 106 (commenting
on standardization generally).
160 Cf id at 109-110.
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regulation and as such it is no surprise that their development is
dominated by business firms (especially mulitnational corporations)
and associated professionals, and that their content reflects the needs
and interests of increasingly mobile capital in a global economy.' 6 '
It is also no surprise that environmental management systems
address a number of issues with vital political implications. These
issues include:
The acceptable environmental impacts of business: EMSs
address this issue by establishing processes within each
organization to identify the significant environmental impacts
of its activities, products and services and set, implement,
monitor and measure its own environmental objectives and
targets;
The improvement of environmental performance: EMSs leave
it to each organization to decide whether, how and at what rate
to improve its environmental performance;' 62
The question of how to manage the risk of disaster: EMSs
consider the risk of environmental disaster as a matter for
proper emergency planning rather than a reason to question
the continued use of certain activities or substances;
The role of public consultation and accountability in
environmental management: most EMSs treat public environ-
mental reporting and the views of local communities, the
public and NGOs as matters for "stakeholder management,"
161 Cf Cutler et al., supra note 67 (identifying and analyzing inter-firm
regulation as one of the principal expressions of private authority in international
affairs).
162 While "continual improvement" is usually understood in the environ-
mental policy community as meaning continual improvement of environmental
performance, ISO 14001 and 14004 define it as the "process of enhancing the
environmental management system to achieve improvements in overall environ-
mental performance," and emphasize that the rate and extent of improvement in
environmental performance are up to the organization to determine and will not
necessarily follow simply from the establishment and operation of an EMS. See,
e.g., ISO 14001, supra note 3 at §§ 3.1 and A.I.
ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT
to be used by the organization to the extent it considers
necessary or desirable to maintain its viability or
competitiveness;
6 3
The relationship between voluntary initiatives and state
regulatory systems: EMSs erect a distinct barrier between
themselves and state regulatory systems, positioning the latter
as a special element of the EMS's external environment that
generates obligations and expenses for the organization and
possesses exclusive authority and responsibility to determine
societal environmental goals and impose corresponding legal
requirements. The EMS addresses this external regulatory
system through a policy commitment to legal compliance and
a set of processes that treat legal requirements much like other
performance parameters,"6' but the incompleteness of the
arbitrage between legal systems and the EMS is underlined by
the fact that organizations have been convicted of environ-
mental regulatory violations yet still been certified as
conforming to ISO 14001; and
Verification ofenvironmental claims andperformance: EMSs
treat the question of verification of organizations' environ-
mental performance or their adherence to particular standards
as matters for objective, neutral determination by independent
commercial experts who operate with specialized professional
training, tools and vocabularies, provide verification services
for profit and treat the information on which verification is
163 For an account of the "stakeholder management" approach to corporate
social responsibility and a proposal for an alternative "rights"-based approach, see
Richard Boele et al., Shell, Nigeria and the Ogoni: A Study in Unsustainable
Development l-Corporate Social Responsibility and 'Stakeholder Management'
Versus a Rights BasedApproach to Sustainable Development, 9(3) SUSTAINABLE
DEV. 121 (2001).
164 For example, ISO 14001 and 14004 provide frameworks for identifying
and documenting applicable legal requirements, setting objectives and targets for
them, monitoring, measuring and reviewing their achievement and taking corrective
action when noncompliance is discovered.
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based as confidential so that the only information disclosed
publicly is the fact of the organization's conformity or
nonconformity to an EMS standard.
On one hand, standardization bodies and other EMS
proponents frequently acknowledge these political stakes at least
implicitly, for example by characterizing voluntary EMS standards as
a contribution to public policy goals such as sustainable development,
admitting that the development and use of EMS standards implicate
important public interests or calling for broader "stakeholder"
participation in standards development and corporate environmental
management. On the other hand, the same actors regularly remind
each other and anyone else that EMSs (and standards generally) are
primarily useful tools developed by business, for business, pointedly
declining to characterize the involvement or conflicting interests of
industry participants as "political". 65
What is most interesting for present purposes is that the choice
to employ the techniques of management systems and standardi-
zation-whether made by a firm, industry association, public authority
or other actor-appears to predispose the resolution of this
ambivalence about the political stakes of corporate environmental
management. The techniques and procedures of standardization and
environmental management systems deactivate these political stakes
by transforming them into technical matters to be resolved by the
application of professional expertise according to apparently neutral
technical criteria, and simultaneously into matters of consumer or
commercial preference to be resolved by the exercise of autonomous
choice in market transactions. EMSs constitute environmental
protection as an apolitical matter to be administered through
bureaucratic organizations. While they can, in theory, be adapted to
organizations of all types and sizes, EMSs are modeled on the
165 Cf Salter, Housework of Capitalism, supra note 82, at 113 (commenting
on standardization generally). As Salter explains, this tendency does not reflect a
desire to disguise the dominant role played by industry in standardization, but
simply to deny that this role is political.
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management hierarchies and processes of large business
organizations. They emphasize hierarchy, routine, procedure, paper-
work, formality and technical expertise. They rely largely on private
market dynamics to signal the need for and success of these technical
procedures and decisions, through the preferences and demands of
customers, suppliers or ultimate consumers. The EMS is
quintessentially a technology of the large bureaucratic organization. 166
Standardization, for its part, transforms conflicts over market
dominance, trade barriers, international competitiveness, health, safety
and environmental protection into technical decisions for experts and
it submits determination of the appropriateness of the resulting
standards to the market through firms' decisions to purchase and
implement the standards and market participants' demand for certified
products or firms. 167 Standardization has been called "the housework
of capitalism": like housework, it is "detailed, mundane, repetitive,
and never completed," and it is "both essential and unrecognized in
the constitution and reproduction of economic and class
relationships.' 68
Standardization is "usually considered a 'MEGO' ('my eyes
glaze over') subject" in most corporate boardrooms. 169 This fact is
more significant than it might first appear. EMSs and EMS standards
are a significant form of governmental technology precisely because
166 This fact may help explain the growing use of EMSs by government
departments and mightjustify the inference that the EMS is a mechanism by which
multinational corporations and other large private organizations such as
standardization bodies are redrawing the lines between public and private, in
informal alliances with large public organizations.
167 See, e.g., INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION FOR STANDARDIZATION, ISO'S
LONG-RANGE STRATEGIES 1999-2001:, RAISING STANDARDS FOR THE WORLD
(1998). An executive summary of this publication is available online at
http://www.iso.ch/iso/enlprods-services/otherpubs/pdf/longrang.pdf (last visited
Nov. 25, 2002) ("ISO develops only those standards which are required by the
market. This work is carried out by experts on loan from the industrial, technical
and business sectors which have asked for the standards, and which subsequently
put them to use").
168 Salter, Housework of Capitalism, supra note 82, at 107.
169 Sheldon, Introduction, supra note 25, at 11.
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they make one's "eyes glaze over"-that is, they mute the struggles
over the distribution of risks, harms, jobs and profits inherent in
environmental politics. By transforming debates overjustice, poverty,
racism, ecological integrity, animal rights, the intrinsic value of
nature, and so on, into matters of managerial expertise and market
preference, these technologies both enable relations of inequality and
repression to be perpetuated and disguise their own role in that
perpetuation.
In these respects EMSs and standardization instantiate a
broader tendency in contemporary liberal practices of government to
depoliticize certain political stakes by positioning them either as
"technical" matters to be resolved by the application of neutral
expertise or "private" matters to be resolved by market forces. 70 The
tendency to "technicalize" is commonly associated with welfare state
liberalism (e.g., the creation of social insurance schemes), while the
"privatization" tendency is commonly associated with free-market
neoliberalism. EMSs, interestingly, embody both tendencies, perhaps
reflecting some of the complexity and ambivalence in the encounter
between welfarist and neoliberal mentalities in contemporary
government.
In general, Canadian public authorities have allowed or
encouraged this (re)drawing, without attempting to push the content
or use of EMSs in any particular direction, although there are now
indications that public authorities might be attempting to encourage
"ISO 14001-Plus" EMSs through regulatory incentive programs such
as Ontario's Cooperative Agreements framework.' 7' Their engage-
ments-e.g., implementing their own EMSs as examples for industry,
encouraging or requiring firms to implement EMSs and beginning to
offer crudely crafted regulatory relief programs to firms with
EMS s-have been relatively credulous and unreflective in comparison
to those of American and European public authorities. One might
criticize these engagements as an abdication of governmental
170 See generally, Rose & Miller, Political Power Beyond the State, supra
note 146, at 196-201.
171 See supra notes 116-121 and accompanying text.
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authority to regulate corporate practices, but this begs the question of
the extent to which state regulation differs from "private" self-
regulation. Among the possible differences are the following. First,
official regulations are not developed by regulated entities themselves
but by government officials with ultimate accountability to an
electorate. This separation between regulators and regulated in
standard-setting is often criticized as illusory, however, due to heavy
reliance on industry for information, an increasing "customer service"
orientation toward regulated industry in some governments, intense
negotiation with industry over pollution standards, and the risk of
regulatory capture. Second, state regulatory systems usually have
public consultation processes that do not depend on the regulated
entity's discretion (e.g., notice and comment, environmental
assessment and judicial review), yet these are often perceived to be
underused and ineffective. Third, there is Garret Hardin's famous
question, "who will watch the watchers?"' Most governments have
established formal, public mechanisms to monitor the behavior of
regulatory agencies, from government watchdog agencies to citizen
suits and judicial review, whereas monitoring of EMS auditors and
certifiers is generally non-public and achieved mainly through
accreditation processes supervised by standardization bodies
themselves or even more obscure institutions. 73 Moreover, since
172 Garret Hardin, The Tragedy ofthe Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243,1245-46
(1968) ("Quis custodiet ipsos custodes?").
17 Accreditation refers to the designation of individuals or organizations as
accredited to certify an organization or product's conformance to a voluntary
standard. Accreditation of ISO 14001 certifiers is done by standards bodies
themselves, and while there have been rumors about the inferior quality of some
certifiers, particularly in the developing world, this is usually left to the market to
sort out. There is very little oversight either of accreditation oraccredited certifiers.
Some coordination of accreditation is achieved through organizations such as the
International Accreditation Forum and the International Social and Environmental
Accreditation and Labeling Alliance. On the latter, see Errol Meidinger, "Emerging
Trans-Sectoral Regulatory Structures in Global Civil Society: The Case of ISEAL
(the International Social and Environmental Accreditation and Labeling Alliance),"
paper presented at joint meetings of Law and Society Association and Research
Committee for the Sociology of Law, 4-7 July, 2001, Budapest, Hungary, at
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auditors and certifiers rely on their clients for income, there is some
risk of "regulatory capture" by the client companies. While this danger
is real, the risk of regulatory capture also exists in state agencies,
particularly given the recent tendency of many environmental agencies
and their political masters to reinvent industry as clients to be served
rather than polluters to be controlled.
More importantly, the technologies of contemporary state
environmental regulation embody, to a significant extent, the same
managerialist tendencies as EMSs to obscure the stakes, struggles and
repressions of environmental politics, relying heavily on technical
expertise, detailed, mundane, repetitive techniques of measurement,
monitoring, calculation, assessment, inspection, etc., and relying
increasingly on private market dynamics. While EMSs are a
particularly clear example of these tendencies, state environmental
regulation shares the same characteristics to a significant degree.
Viewed as governmental technologies, then, EMSs and
standardization render environmental management a matter of
technical expertise, organizational routine and market preference,
contributing to the expulsion of a set of environmental and economic
issues from the political domain.'74 Not all voluntary corporate
initiatives share these characteristics, but this case nonetheless draws
attention to the benefits of examining the problems of "government"
at the level of the mundane technologies by which rule is effectuated.
Such examination can enable one to expose redrawings of the
public/private divide and reclaim environmental management as an
arena for political contestation.
http://law.buffalo.edu/homepage/ eemeid/scholarship/ISEAL.pdf(last visited Aug.
1,2001).
174 The success of this expulsion is reflected in the fact that despite their
major implications for environmental quality, public health, international
competitiveness and regulatory autonomy, voluntary EMS initiatives have received
little attention from academics, almost none from news media and grassroots
organizations, and have only recently begun to attract serious attention from public
authorities.
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The PoliticalRationalities of Environmental Management Systems
The case of EMSs and EMS standards signals a shift in the
rationales of governance, not just in the area of corporate environ-
mental management but in discourse about government generally.
Political rationalities can be thought of as the discursive "software"
through which governmental technologies operate and produce
effects.' My main argument in this section is that the political
rationalities of environmental management systems and standardiza-
tion-that is, the discursive fields within which the forms and goals
of government, the proper boundaries of state and market and the
roles of public and private authorities are conceptualized and
justified-reinforce the tendency described in the previous section to
depoliticize environmental management.
The political rationalities of EMSs consists of a loose set of
ideas, claims, justifications, themes and story-lines about environ-
mental management that are developed and maintained by a
transnational coalition of corporate managers, industry groups,
management consultants, trade publications, standardization
professionals, public authorities, academics and others. These actors
are united not by a common goal or strategy (indeed, many of them
have never met let alone agreed on goals or strategies) but by their
employment of a particular set of claims and story-lines about the
challenge of environmental degradation and the appropriate tools and
actors to address it. 176
First, as hinted in the previous section, the discourse of EMS
reflects a distinctly "managerialist" view of the challenge of
environmental degradation. Improving management practices-in
particular, by adopting an organization-wide management system
based on the "total quality management" concept-is the best way to
175" Cf MAARTEN HAJER, THE POLITICS OF ENVIRONMENTAL DISCOURSE 60
(1995).
176 Cf id at 12-13, 58-68; Dorte Salskov-Iversen et al., Governmentality,
Globalization and Local Practice: Transformations of a Hegemonic Discourse, 25
ALTERNATIVES: Soc. TRANSFORMATION & HUMANE GOVERNANCE 183 (2000).
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improve the environmental performance of organizations and their
products.1" This implies a particular conception of the environmental
crisis. While acknowledging that industrial society has produced
severe environmental degradation, the managerialist conception does
not view this crisis as a fundamental challenge to existing institutions
and practices of industrial society. Rather, major environmental
disasters of recent memory are interpreted primarily as management
process failures, the environmental crisis is seen as under control and
gradually improving, and well-planned and properly implemented
management systems are seen as the key to managing the adverse
environmental impacts of business.' The environmental crisis is
something to be managed through the application of managerial skill,
objective technical expertise, organizational routine and individual
motivation.
Second, this managerialist approach is portrayed as both
effecting and depending for its own effectiveness upon a transforma-
tion of corporate culture. The main potential of an EMS is often
identified as its capacity to change organizational culture by
integrating environmental protection into all activities and decisions
of the enterprise.'79 This cultural transformation is accompanied by
an ethic of individual responsibility for environmental protection,
from the CEO to the lowliest employee. An EMS "gathers all your
17 See, e.g., ISO Technical Committee 207, About ISO/TC 207, at
http://www.tc207.org/abouttc207/aboutTC207_main.html (last visited Nov. 25,
2002) [hereinafter ISO/TC 207]; Cary Coglianese and Jennifer Nash,
Environmental Management Systems and the New Policy Agenda, in COGLIANESE
& NASH, REGULATING FROM THE INSIDE, supra note 2, 1, at II [hereinafter
Coglianese & Nash, EMS and the New Policy Agenda].
178 See, e.g., Sheldon, Introduction, supra note 25, at 12; Joseph Cascio, "The
ISO 14001 Standard," in CASCIO, ISO 14000 HANDBOOK, supra note 2, 24 at 25.
179 See, e.g., Coglianese & Nash, EMS and the New Policy Agenda, supra
note 178, at 12; Cascio, Introduction, supra note 73, at 4; John D. Wolfe, CSA's
Environmental Management Program and its Relationship to other National and
International Environmental Management Systems Initiatives, in ENVIRONMENTAL
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employees and managers into a system of shared and enlightened
awareness and personal responsibility for your organization's
environmental performance," relying on training, competence and
motivation of individual employees rather than blind obedience to
regulations or corporate directives and punishment of errors.I"0 This
theme of the "responsibilization" of the individual for his or her own
well-being or the well-being of organizations or society is found not
only in the environmental management context but throughout public
policy discourses in recent years.
Third, one of the most striking attributes of the discourse of
EMS, shared by most contemporary voluntary environmental
initiatives, is its reinvention of environmental protection as "good
business" rather than an unfortunate cost. The discourse presents both
aggressive and defensive business rationales for EMSs. On one hand,
EMSs create "win-win" opportunities to improve environmental
performance and increase shareholder value by enhancing corporate
image, improving customer relations, realizing cost-savings (e.g., via
energy conservation or waste recycling) and promoting innovation
(e.g., product and process improvements).18' On the other hand, EMSs
are portrayed as defensive tools to maintain and increase
competitiveness, especially in the face of globalization and trade
liberalization."8 2
Fourth, EMSs and EMS standards are portrayed as a basis for
a constructive new relationship with regulators and the public based
IS0 Cascio, "The ISO 14001 Standard," supra note 112 at 24-25.
181 See, e.g., Coglianese & Nash, EMS and the New Policy Agenda, supra
note 178, at 11; Oswald A. Dodds, An Insight into the Development and
Implementation of the International Environmental Management System ISO
14001, in HILLARY, ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS AND CLEANER
PRODUCTION, supra note 13, 27; Dick Hortensius & Mark Barthel, Beyond 14001:
An Introduction to the ISO 14000 Series, in SHELDON, ISO 14001 AND BEYOND,
supra note 2, 19; Gabriele Crognale, Environmental Management at a Crossroads:
Time for a Radical Breakthrough, in ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT STRATEGIES:
THE 21 ST CENTURY PERSPECTIVE (Gabriele Crognale, ed. 1999) 2 at 2.
192 See, e.g., Wolfe, Drivers for International Integrated Environmental
Management, supra note 14, at 15.
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on cooperation and partnership rather than coercion and mistrust." 3
The traditional "command and control" mode of regulation is
acknowledged to have produced many successes but is seen as having
reached its limit. EMSs are presented as a market-driven, voluntary,
flexible, efficient and effective alternative or supplement to sclerotic,
inefficient, costly, rigid, near-sighted, backlogged, overtaxed,
sometimes adversarial and ineffective regulatory systems.' 4 Private
market dynamics, in the form of supply-chain pressures, consumer
demand and trade association requirements, are positioned as
constructive alternatives to messy political deliberations and inflex-
ible, inefficient legal systems.' In turn, the citizen formerly depen-
dent on welfare state paternalism is reinvented as the autonomous,
self-helping consumer, exercising individual environmental respon-
sibility through consumer choice.
All of these claims and story-lines are linked by an
overarching goal and moral justification: that EMSs and EMS
standards will contribute to the realization of sustainable develop-
ment.8 6 This claim is common in the discourses of corporate greening
and is shared not just with most corporate environmental initiatives
but with almost all environmental policy initiatives in the last decade.
The ISO 14000 series of standards, in particular, was expressly
designed to be one of the business community's major contributions
to the global public policy goal of sustainable development and to
inaugurate a new approach to environmental management not only for
183 See, e.g., Hortensius & Barthel, supra note 182, at 32.
184 See, e.g., Reiley, supra note 12; Murray, supra note 44; Pezzoli, supra
note 44; Stenzel, supra note 21; Lally, supra note 12; Crognale, supra note 115;
Cascio, Introduction, supra note 73; Coglianese & Nash, EMS and the New Policy
Agenda, supra note 178, at 7-9.
185 See, e.g., Sheldon, Introduction, supra note 25, at 14.
186 See, e.g., ISO/TC 207, supra note 178; Crognale, supra note 115 at 6;
Cascio, Introduction, supra note 73, at 4. ISO's work on EMS standards, for
instance, was explicitly initiated as one of the global business community's main
contributions to sustainable development in the context of the 1992 Rio Earth
Summit. See, e.g., ISO/TC 207, supra note 178; Hortensius & Barthel, supra note
182.
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business but for any organization, from hospitals to universities to
military bases to government departments.
Finally, the political rationalities of EMSs locate EMSs in a
non-political arena. While acknowledging the political effects of
EMSs and EMS standards (e.g., their contribution to sustainable
development, international trade or state regulatory policy), the
discourse of EMS positions corporations, standards bodies and EMSs
as operating outside politics, in contrast to such "politically oriented
bodies" as environmental NGOs, political parties and public
authorities. 17
The political rationalities of EMSs thus redefine the legitimate
concerns of the state in a manner that carves out a substantial chunk
of environmental politics for organizations such as business firms to
resolve on their own through technocratic management and private
market signals. It vests the elaboration and application of important
norms of conduct and the delivery of certain environmental public
goods in large non-governmental organizations such as multinational
corporations, standardization bodies, consulting firms, auditors and
certifiers. It presents a particular conception of the appropriate roles
of the firm, market, employee, citizen and state in managing
environmental risks and harms and justifies these arrangements for the
exercise of power in terms of good business sense, proper
management processes, individual employee responsibility, the
potential for autonomous consumer choice, the limits of the regulatory
state and the ultimate pursuit of sustainable development.
This redrawing of the domain and forms of government is
closely linked to two broader political discourses, ecological
modernization and smart regulation. Ecological modernization has
emerged, since the late 1970s, as the dominant way of conceptualizing
environmental problems in the advanced industrial democracies.'88
Ecological modernization understands environmental harm as a
systematic product of the modem industrial "risk" society, but one
that can be addressed through technocratic management. In this vision
187 See, e.g., Cascio, THE ISO 14000 HANDBOOK, supra note 2, at 10.
188 See generally HAJER, supra note 176.
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the environmental crisis no longer represents a fundamental threat to
industrial society, as it did in the 1970s, but an opportunity for its
further development. Environmental protection and industrial
development are compatible "win-win" propositions. The pursuit of
sustainable development, one of the key moral justifications of EMSs,
is intimately linked with ecological modernization by virtue of its
emphasis on integration of environmental considerations into all
business and governmental decision-making, consideration of and
communication with a broad range of stakeholders, and the suscept-
ibility of environmental crisis to rational management. The political
rationalities of EMSs thus coincide very closely with the discourse of
ecological modernization.
Another prominent discourse in contemporary environmental
politics that is closely related to and perhaps subsumed in ecological
modernization, is the discourse of "smart" or "responsive" regula-
tion."8 9 This discourse acknowledges the accomplishments of
"command and control" regulation but argues that it has reached the
limits of its cost-effectiveness and technical capacity, due to cost,
inefficiency, inflexibility and regulators' resource and information
constraints. On the other hand, this discourse also rejects neoliberal-
ism, with its radical skepticism about the capacities of the state to
govern for the best and its enthusiasm for free markets, property rights
and deregulation. It argues that most "regulation" is already in the
hands of actors other than the state and uses this insight to propose a
new conception of the regulatory process that transcends sterile
regulation-deregulation and market-state dichotomies. It proposes new
regulatory strategies that combine state, market, private and public
actors and forms of regulation and enlist non-state resources and
mechanisms such as self-regulation, EMSs, eco-labeling schemes,
environmental reporting and industry-community agreements in
furtherance of "governing at a distance." 9 ' Some variants of this
discourse draw upon private sector management discourses to
189 See generally GUNNINGHAM & GRABOSKY, supra note 44, at 5-19; Ayres
& Braithwaite, supra note 52; Osborne & Gaebler, supra note 52.
190 GUNNINGHAM & GRABOSKY, supra note 44, at 10-13.
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promote competition and marketization in government functions, a
"client service" orientation in public administration (regulated entities
as clients, state as service provider), individual autonomy (individuals
as self-helping, autonomous, co-responsible entrepreneurs) and
managerialism (conceptualization of life in entrepreneurial terms; use
of managerial techniques). 9 ' This discourse of regulatory reinvention
meshes well with the discourse of EMS, and provides the broader
rationale for most of the engagements I have observed between
Canadian public authorities and EMS initiatives.
This examination of the political rationalities of EMS suggests
two things: first, that the deactivation of political conflict seen in the
discourses of EMSs and standardization will be one of the key
political challenges in the era of "smart regulation". The political
rationalities I have described constitute the realm of EMSs as a
private, voluntary order in dichotomous, sometimes antagonistic
relation to the messy, inefficient, cumbersome public realm of law and
politics, and simultaneously obscure the process by which this
division between public and private realms is created, by representing
EMSs as always already private, voluntary and apolitical.'92 The
interpretation of environmental crisis as a "win-win" proposition, an
opportunity for entrepreneurial thinking, a matter for expert,
technocratic management "at a distance," reinforces this tendency to
mute the political struggles and distributive stakes of environmental
management.
Second, it seems likely that "steering" may emerge as the most
prominent form of engagement of public authorities with private
authority in the field of environmental governance. The increasing
emphasis on "action at a distance" in current mentalities of govern-
ment points to a conception of the state as helmsman, selectively
91 Salskov-lversen et al., supra note 177.
192 De Larrinaga makes a similar argument regarding Shell's statements about
its (non-)involvement in the repression of the Ogoni people in Nigeria. Miguel de
Larrinaga, (Re)Politicizing the Discourse: Globalization Is a S(h)ell Game, 25
ALTERNATIVES: SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION AND HUMANE GOVERNANCE 145
(2000).
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steering the development and use of regulatory strategies and tools by
others through participation in the creation of voluntary programs,
funding of non-state policy development institutions such as
standardization bodies, provision of high-level strategic direction for
non-state policy-making, pronouncement of official positions on
voluntary initiatives, and regulation of the ground-rules, boundaries
and limits of non-state governance by manipulating competition,
securities, corporate and consumer protection law, public participation
rules and regulatory "backstops". One might also expect "reward" and
"self-discipline" to figure prominently in state strategies as public
authorities attempt to steer environmental self-government by offering
regulatory incentives and setting examples through self-application of
voluntary disciplines.
Part V: What Role for Law?
I conclude with some tentative suggestions about the role for
law in the transformation of the public/private divide in Canadian
politics. My research into EMSs and EMS standards reveal two
important characteristics of contemporary government: first, that
government, understood as all the more or less systematic attempts to
direct human conduct to appropriate ends, is widely distributed among
myriad public and private authorities in a hybridized public-private
space; but second, that in any given problem space the unequal
distribution of governmental authority tends to produce and reproduce
social relations of power and inequality.
Two general conclusions follow from these observations: that
some form of "smart regulation," relying on a mix of state and non-
state actors and regulatory tools is appropriate to deal with the
distributed character of government; but that a key challenge in the
design and exercise of such government will be to resist the tendency
to "depoliticize" through the move to neutral technical expertise and
private market transactions. Opening space for such resistance
requires, first of all, attention to the political stakes that EMSs and
EMS standards tend to submerge. This involves asserting the politics
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of "merely technical" choices' 93 such as the decision to delegate
authority to technical experts or the private market and the
construction of the citizen as autonomous consumer and self-helping
entrepreneur. It also calls for more concrete exploration of the distri-
butive consequences of corporate environmental management
decisions than I have attempted here, along with more detailed
examination of how the rationalities and technologies of environ-
mental management produce and obscure such consequences.
Law and legal practitioners can play numerous roles in the
politics of voluntary EMS standards, in some cases facilitating and
shaping the expansion of "private" non-regulatory initiatives, in others
resisting it, and in others playing little or no role. While strategies and
techniques deployed in legal relations can probably have a significant
impact on the transformation of the public-private divide, in the case
of EMS standards this potential has so far gone largely unrealized in
Canada. Although Canadian regulators, legislators and courts have
employed most of the modes of engagement I describe in Part II, it is
fair to say that their responses to voluntary EMS initiatives have been
minimal and incoherent.
The important question for present purposes is whether and
how law can be used to resist the depoliticization of environmental
management; i.e. to insist on the political stakes of environmental
management decisions and create space to work toward greater
justice, equality, human health and ecological integrity? At a
minimum, law might be deployed as a "border guard" to define and
protect certain "public" stakes of EMSs. EMSs can be a very useful
tool for organizations internally and in their relations with business
partners and market participants, but many (including ISO 14001-
based EMSs) provide inadequate guarantees of public consultation
and accountability, environmental performance and legal compliance
to merit giving them any particular weight in non-market relations
with governments and the public.
193 Compare Duncan Kennedy, The Political Stakes in 'Merely Technical'
Issues of Contract Law, paper presented at Osgoode Hall Law School, Toronto
(September 17, 2000) (copy on file with author).
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Legal tools and strategies should be designed, at a minimum,
to insist on these basic public stakes when rewarding or relying on
them in state regulatory instruments, for instance by requiring more
than the minimal "basic EMS" defined in Alberta's new LEAD
program, requiring public consultation and transparency in the setting,
monitoring and review of environmental performance and rewarding
only firms that consistently exceed compliance with legal
requirements (including improvement of performance on non-
regulated parameters). Basic corporate governance rules requiring
maximization of shareholder value might be revisited to expand the
range of "stakeholders" whose interests managers are permitted (or
required) to take into account. Moreover, legal actors such as
prosecutors and courts should be urged to take a firmly skeptical
attitude toward EMSs and EMS standards and inform themselves fully
of their characteristics before incorporating them in orders or using
them as a standard for liability.
More ambitiously, governments, lawyers and citizens might
use law as part of a broader political strategy to influence the
redefinition of public and private in the context of environmental
management. The role of law and legal practitioners in this strategy
could be to claim and defend a broad space for democratic
experimentation in the face of the homogenizing tendencies of global
trade liberalization (as evidenced, for instance, in the TBT Agree-
ment) and government "reinvention". Just how this might be done is
a question for further reflection and action."4
194 Unger's ideas about institutional imagination and democratic
experimentalism present interesting possibilities in this direction, the exploration
of which is unfortunately beyond the scope of this paper . See, e.g., ROBERTO
MANGABEIRA UNGER, WHAT SHOULD LEGAL ANALYSIS BECOME? (1996);
ROBERTO MANGABEIRA UNGER, DEMOCRACY REALIZED: THE PROGRESSIVE
ALTERNATIVE (1998).
